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In this dissertation I focus on two considerations that influence the
product strategy of a firm. The first is consumers’ choice and its influence on
a firm’s product offering, and the second is the interaction between durable
products and their contingent consumables. First, I study the assortment
planning problem for a firm; I illustrate the complexity of solving this prod-
uct selection problem, present simple solutions for some commonly used
choice models, and develop heuristics for other practically motivated mod-
els. Second, I study the incentives of a durable goods monopolist when
she can lock-in consumers through a contingent consumable. Adopting a
lock-in strategy has two interesting effects on the incentives of a durable
goods manufacturer. On one hand, by locking-in consumers to its consum-
able, a durable goods monopolist can curb its temptation to reduce durable
prices over time, thereby mitigating the classic time inconsistency problem.
On the other hand, lock-in will create a hold-up issue and adversely affect
vii
consumers’ expectations of future prices for the consumable. My research
demonstrates the trade-off between time inconsistency and hold-up, and
derives insights about the conditions under which a lock-in strategy can be
effective. I further analyze the trade-off between time inconsistency and
hold-up associated with lock-in in the presence of consumable stock-piling.
My findings indicate in the presence of consumer stock-piling, lock-in has
an effect similar to that of competition in the consumables market: they
help to dampen the hold-up problem that arises from lock-in and at the
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The value realized by a firm from selling its products is determined
to a large extent by the strategy that is used to bring the products to market
(Chesbrough (2003)). Firms that launched successful products such as Ap-
ple (iPod) and Microsoft (Xbox) have been credited with adopting the right
product strategy for their products (Wall Street Journal (2006)) . Therefore
it is important for firms to consider implications of the product strategies
they adopt. In my research, I focus on two interactions that have economic
consequences for a firm; The first is how consumers make choices and its
influence on the optimal product assortments, and the second is the inter-
action between durable products and their contingent consumables.
Choosing the right assortment is an important consideration for a
firm as this determines to a large extent a firm’s patronage and therefore
her profits. Indeed, it is also a very difficult decision for firms because of
the complexity associated with consumer’s choice. To understand the in-
teraction between consumer choice and product selection issues for a firm,
we model customer preferences through the definition of consumer types,
where a type is a ranking of the potential products by order of preference.
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A customer purchases the highest ranked product (if any) offered in the as-
sortment. Products also differ in their cost and price parameters so they
have different levels of profitability for the firm. First, we consider a gen-
eral consumer choice model and show that there is very little structure to
the optimal assortment(s). We find that one should always offer the most
profitable product, as measured by the profit margin. Second, by placing
practically motivated restrictions on the general choice model (such as the
Multinomial Logit model, the locational choice model or the Markovian sec-
ond choice model), we obtain an efficient method to determine the optimal
assortment for several of them. In some cases the problem of finding an
optimal assortment can be likened to solving a shortest path problem or a
dynamic program. In others cases, we show that the optimal assortment(s)
contain(s) a certain number of the most profitable products. Finally, we
suggest a number of heuristics and test their performance numerically in
the two models for which we do not have an efficient method for obtaining
an optimal solution. We find that the best two are greedy-type heuristics, in
which products are added to (or removed from) the assortment in decreas-
ing order of their impact on expected profit.
When consumers are forward looking or strategic, they trade-off the
value of purchasing the good now to the expected future value. For exam-
ple, when consumers make purchase decisions on durables such as an au-
tomobile, they are more sensitive to the anticipated future price of the good
than for products they purchase for instantaneous consumption. This trade-
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off faced by strategic consumers, has practical implications for the durable
good manufacturers in choosing a suitable business model to adopt. In
this dissertation, we specifically look at the interaction between the effect
of durability and the firms ability to lock-in through a contingent consum-
able, and the implications of lock-in for durable good manufacturers. Many
durable products cannot be used without a contingent consumable prod-
uct, e.g. printers require ink, iPods require songs, razors require blades,
etc. For such products, manufacturers may be able to lock-in consumers by
making their product incompatible with consumables that are produced by
other firms. We examine the effectiveness of such a strategy in the presence
of strategic consumers who anticipate the future prices of both the durable
product and the contingent consumable. On the one hand, by locking-in
consumers to its own contingent consumable, a durable goods manufac-
turer can dampen its own incentive to reduce durables prices over time,
thereby mitigating the classic time inconsistency problem. On the other
hand, lock-in will also create a hold-up issue and will adversely affect con-
sumers’ expectations of future prices for the contingent consumable. We
demonstrate the trade-off between these two issues, time inconsistency and
hold-up, and derive analytical results that provide insights about the con-
ditions under which a lock-in strategy can be effective. We also analyze
the effect of competition in the contingent product market. We find that, at
the same time that competition reduces the hold-up problem, presence of
a large number of them erodes the firm’s revenue from the contingent con-
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sumables, increasing her incentive to reduce prices on the durable. Thus,
high levels of competition in the consumable market can worsen the time
inconsistency issue.
When the use that a consumer can obtain from a durable is linked
to the consumption of a contingent consumable, consumers are clearly con-
cerned about the durable product manufacturer’s incentive to i) reduce the
price of durables over time (time inconsistency), and ii) restrict the avail-
ability of consumables in the future (lock-in). Both these concerns affect
consumers decisions to purchase the durable; in particular, for consumers,
lock-in potentially creates a hold-up problem with respect to the consum-
ables. In anticipation of this hold-up problem, consumers will have an incen-
tive to stock-pile consumables for future use. In this dissertation, we also
explore the effect of stock-pile of consumables on the interaction between
time inconsistency and hold-up. We find that in the presence of stock-piling,
lock-in has an effect that can be likened to the presence of competition in the
consumables market.
The rest of the document is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I
review the literature in assortment planning and durable products that is
relevant to my work. In Chapters 3, I develop and solve a firm’s assortment
planning problem under a general consumer choice model. In Chapter 4, I
develop a model to capture the interaction between time inconsistency and
lock-in for a durable product firm that adopts a lock-in policy. In Chapter 5,
I analyze the effect of stock-piling on the interaction between time inconsis-
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My dissertation examines two important factors that influence the
product strategy of a firm; Chapter 3 focuses on the first consideration:
’consumers’ choice and its influence on the optimal product assortments’.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the second consideration: ’the interaction be-
tween durable products and their contingent consumables’. Below, I review
the literature that is relevant to my work in i) Chapter 3 on assortment plan-
ning, and ii) in Chapters 4 and 5 on strategic considerations for a durable
product firm.
2.1. Assortment Planning
Assortment planning problems generally look at a retailer who takes
the position and price of the products as given and has to decide on which
products to include in her assortment from a finite list of products offered by
different manufacturers. In solving for the optimal assortment, researchers
have adopted one of the following two assumptions as a basis for how con-
sumers substitute from among offered products , i) assortment based sub-
stitution also called static substitution and ii) stock-out based substitution
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or dynamic substitution. As with our research, much of the literature on
assortment planning has focused on static substitution models and I will
review the relevant papers below. Identifying the structure of the optimal
assortment under dynamic substitution is considerably harder ; however
there a few papers such as Smith and Agrawal (2000), Mahajan and van
Ryzin (2001) , Hopp and Xu (2007) and Honhon et al. (2009) , that have
made strides in this area.
As our study considers assortment-based or static substitution, we
review the related literature in detail. In the realm of static substitution,
researchers have mainly focused on stylized models that allow for under-
standing the structural properties of the optimal assortments. For example,
van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) and Li (2007), adopt a Multinomial Logit
model and show that the optimal assortment contains most popular prod-
ucts and most profitable products respectively; Gaur and Honhon (2006)
show that under a locational choice model it is not necessary for the firm to
offer the most popular products.
The above work identifies how the optimal assortment relates to the
assumptions on how consumers make choices; in doing so, a majority of
them ignore inventory considerations, and except for Li (2007), all of the
papers discussed above assume that products have identical price and cost
structure. However, there are a few studies that take into account inventory
considerations; for example, Netessine and Rudi (2003) and Bassok et al.
(1999) study the assortment planning problem under downward substitu-
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tion and inventory considerations; and a few studies for example, Hopp and
Xu. (2005) that allow for endogeneous pricing. Hopp and Xu. (2005) study
the joint assortment planning and pricing decisions under the Multinomial
Logit model and show that optimal assortment is composed of variants with
equal mark-ups. Kok et al. (2008) give a comprehensive literature review on
assortment planning under considerations such as consumer search costs,
competition, basket shoppers, dynamic assortment rotation etc.
In our paper we consider a make-to-order setting and look at a price-
taking firm who has to choose the best assortment to offer to consumers,
that is, the menu of products they can choose from. We use a ranking based
consumer choice model where each consumer belongs to one of the many
types, where a type is represented by a ranking of all or some of the prod-
ucts that could potentially be offered. Mahajan and van Ryzin (2001) were
the first ones to use this model to solve for the optimal assortment under dy-
namic consumer substitution. In addition to the ranking based preference,
we allow for products to have different cost and price characteristics.
Our consumer choice model encompasses a lot of other stylized mod-
els used in literature. As we will see, by placing simple restrictions, our
model can be reduced to most of models presented in the literature such as
Multinomial Logit, Hotelling, Markovian second choice etc. We lose some
tractability owing to the structure of our consumer model, our attempt how-
ever, is to stretch the boundaries of our knowledge under more general con-
sumer choice models and this is infact one of our primary contributions.
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We also develop sub-classes of consumer models, which can be obtained by
restrictions on the order in which consumers substitute. Based on the sever-
ity of the restrictions, we can obtain methods that are of O(n) , O(n2) and
O(n4). Some of the restricted models can be likened to solving the short-
est path of a network. A shortest path based result was also obtained by
Alptekinoglu (2004) under a setting in which prices of the products are en-
dogeneous. However, we are among the first ones to obtain the shortest
path result is for the situation in which the firm is a price-taker. As a special
case of our general model, we solve the assortment planning problem under
Markovian second choice as in Smith and Agrawal (2000). While they resort
to an integer programming based approach, we provide an alternative al-
gorithm called the In-Out algorithm that works well for Markovian second
choice. Although our method is not necessarily computationally superior
than the integer programming approach, it is novel and also throws light
on the process in which products can be eliminated from consideration. A
distinguishing feature of our work is that it is among the first studies that at-
tempts to understand the properties of optimal assortment under a general
consumer choice model.
2.2. Durable Products and Strategic Considerations
It is well known that a durable goods monopolist(DGM) loses market
power because of her incentive to reduce prices of durables over time in or-
der to increase market share. This is often referred to as time-inconsistency
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and was first articulated by Coase (1972). Bulow (1982) showed that, by
leasing her products, the DGM can eliminate time-inconsistency and make
profits comparable to that of non-durable monopolists. The question of
leasing vs selling has received a lot of attention in the research on durable
products. Bucovetsky and Chilton (1986) show that, although a DGM prefers
to rent his durables to maximize profit, under the threat of entry, they em-
ploy a mixture of leasing and selling. Desai and Purohit (1998) find that
if the units sold by the DGM depreciate faster than leased units, then the
DGM is better off under selling. In a competitive setting, Desai and Puro-
hit (1999) find that the proportion of leases is lower for less reliable prod-
ucts. Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2005), show that, in the presence of comple-
mentary products, selling may be more favorable for the manufacturer as
it helps stimulate demand for complementary products. Bhaskaran and
Gilbert (2008) also find that the intensity of competition among interme-
diaries that sell durables, affects the extent of leasing or selling employed
by the DGM.
When leasing is not possible, as is the case for certain durables, extant
research looks at credible mechanisms that implicitly or explicitly allow the
DGM to make commitments about future production and ameliorate time-
inconsistency. DGMs optimally choose to under invest in durability and/or
employ an inefficient production technology (Bulow (1986)). Desai et al.
(2004) show that, through the introduction of an intermediary it is possible
to reduce time inconsistency. Arya and Mittendorf (2006) argue that DGM
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may benefit from double marginalization problem in the channel under cer-
tain contracts, as it naturally restricts output of the durable, thus mitigating
time inconsistency.
There are many mechanisms through which vendors can lock-in con-
sumers, we review some of the existing research in this area. A common
form of lock-in is seen in markets in which there are consumption external-
ities. Katz and Shapiro (1985) analyze an oligopoly model in the presence
of such externalities and explore the incentives for firms to produce com-
patible goods. They find that firms with weak networks favor compatibility
and firms with large networks or good reputation are against compatibility.
Farrell and Saloner (1985) look at the problem of standardization and inno-
vation in the presence of network externalities. They find that when firms
have asymmetric preferences for new technology, then a lack of coordina-
tion results in excess inertia; where firms are slow to move to new standards
even if they agree on the benefits of the change. Farrell and Klemperer
(2004), observe that presence of either of the two, switching costs or net-
work effects can lock consumers in and give sellers ex-post market power.
They also find that incompatible competition favors incumbent firms and
results in a higher efficiency loss than that of compatible competition. It is
possible for manufacturers to lock consumers into their product by tying
their monopolized good to an unrelated good. When the tied good faces
competition, then Whinston (1990) shows that this form of lock-in can make
it unprofitable for her rival to operate. However, when the tied good and
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the tying good are complements, Whinston (1990) recognizes that reducing
competition by tying, may not be beneficial to the monopolist, especially if
the degree of complementarity between the tied goods is high. Carlton and
Waldman (2002) and Choi and Stefanadis (2001) investigate how tying in
the early stages of a product’s life cycle can influence or deter competition
from entering the market.
On the implications for product strategies for firms in the presence
of network externalities, Conner (1995) finds that adopting a proprietary
product strategy may not always be the best thing for a firm. Sun et al.
(2004) also show that the strength of the network effects plays an important
role in determining whether firms should adopt product line extensions,
lump sum fee, royalty fee or free licensing strategy.
By modeling the interaction between durable products and their con-
tingent consumables, our research captures the trade-off between the ad-
verse affects of time-inconsistency and lock-in. As a significant number of
durables are used with consumables, our work has practical implications
for durable good manufacturers in deciding the right business model for
their product. In Chapters 4 and 5, we focus on the durables that are used
with a contingent consumable, primarily focusing on the interaction be-
tween time inconsistency which arises from durability of the product, and
hold-up which arises from the durable good manufacturer’s lock-in strat-
egy. To our knowledge, this research is among the first studies to examine
the interaction between time inconsistency and hold-up, and the implica-
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tions of this interaction for a monopolist manufacturer of durable goods.
In Chapter 5, we extend our examination of the interaction between
time inconsistency and hold-up in the presence of consumer stock-piling.
In traditional models of operations management, inventory is modeled as a
hedge against demand or supply uncertainty. In Chapter 5, we recognize a
reason why inventory may be held in the absence of either of these forms of
uncertainty. The idea of holding inventory for strategic reasons is an inter-
esting one and has been explored only to a limited extent in the operations
management literature, for example by Anand et al. (2008) and Ferguson
and Koenigsberg (2007). To my knowledge this will be the first analysis to
consider strategic inventories and its effect on time-inconsistency and lock-
in, and will be in my view, an important contribution to the literature on
strategic inventories as well as durable products.
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Chapter 3
Making the most of choice: Product selection
under heterogeneous consumer preferences
3.1. Introduction
Online retailers and search firms face a routine and complex task of
choosing the right products to display from the multitude they offer, in a
way that addresses consumers’ needs and also maximizes the profits they
can make from their offering. There a number of firms that dedicate their
resources to improving the online display of the products in response to a
search. For example, product search firms such as Nextag and travel search
engines such as Kayak, have to choose the best set of products to display in
response to consumers’ search requests.
That this product selection process is routine is easy to understand;
However, to see that it is also a task that is tremendously complex, let us
consider the following example. Consider a group of consumers looking
to buy a wok; a customer A, may prefer a product with a wooden handle
over the one with a plastic handle over the one with a stainless steel han-
dle. Another customer B, may prefer an anodized wok to a non-stick one
to a stainless steel one, there may be a consumer whose preference order
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is based on price. Of course, it is possible, unlike above examples, that a
consumer may have a preference ordering that is not based on any single
attribute. As such, the consumer population for a product category may
consist of types of consumers who rank the same set of products differently.
How consumers choose from a set of products is an important consideration
for firms in planning their assortments. It is possible to capture a greater
segment of consumer population by making every consumer’s first choice
available in the product offering; but this prevents consumers from sub-
stituting to possibly more profitable items. Another extreme is to offer only
the most profitable items but this may lead to reduced patronage. Firms can
leverage their knowledge of consumer substitution patterns to strategically
choose their assortments in order to divert the right amount of demand to
more profitable products.
In this research, our objective is to understand the key influences in a
firm’s product selection decisions in the presence of consumers who have a
heterogeneous preference ordering for different products. In particular, our
interest is to investigate the existence of a simple structure for the optimal
assortment and devise efficient methods to improve the product selection
process for a firm. In order to achieve our objective, we use a consumer
choice model based on rank ordering of products that may not be unique
to the entire consumer population, and start our investigation by assessing
the impact of product profitability and popularity in the process of selecting
the optimal assortment.
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It is known that the extent of the influence of an individual prod-
uct’s profitability and popularity on the optimal product offering depends
on the product characteristics and certainly on the way consumers make
choice. For example, a firm is better off by offering its most popular prod-
ucts, when all the products are equally priced and consumer preferences
are represented by the Multinomial Logit model (van Ryzin and Mahajan,
1999). However, choosing products based on popularity is not necessarily
the best strategy for a firm when either the consumer preferences are as in
the Lancaster or Hotelling model, or when all the products have different
levels of profitability under a MNL model of consumer choice(Li, 2007); In
fact, Li finds that the profitability measure is suitable for choosing the op-
timal assortment. Given this contrast, it is of interest to further examine
how popularity and profitability together determine the optimal product
offering.
Our research first sheds light on the influence of profitability and
popularity, we will see that when a firm caters to a heteregenous consumer
population, most common measures of popularity and the profitability of
a product fail to explain the characteristics of the optimal assortment, in-
dicating that their interaction could be quite complex. Deciphering this
complexity in product interaction poses the biggest challenge in arriving
at an optimal assortment. We will see that when consumers preferences
can be characterized by a substitution pattern that is ordered, then we find
efficient methods to obtain optimal solution. In the absence of such an or-
16
dered structure some of the heuristics we develop improve the efficiency
of search for the optimal solution.We find that although, under the general
choice model, greedy-type methods fail to find the optimal solution but as
heuristics, they perform very well.
3.1.1 Model
We use bold characters to represent vectors and subscript to denote
their components, e.g., qj is the j-th component of vector q. Sets and matri-
ces are denoted by capital letters. |S| denotes the cardinality of set S.
Consumer Choice model
We consider a product category consisting of n potential products,
indexed 1 to n. Let = {1, . . . , n}. Let 0 denote the no-purchase option.
Customers are heterogeneous in their choice behavior: each customer be-
longs to a consumer type. A consumer type is a vector of products that ev-
ery customer of that type is willing to purchase, arranged in decreasing
order of preference. For example, a customer of type (1, 2, 4) has product
1 as his first choice, product 2 as his second choice, product 4 as his third
choice, and he never buys products 3 and 5 to n. In general, a type τ is
a vector (τ1, ..., τm) of product indices such that {τ1, ..., τm} ⊆ N. Let T be
the set of all possible types. Also, let ατ be the proportion of customers
of type τ ∈ T in the customer population, such that ∑τ∈T ατ = 1. Let
T+ = {τ ∈ T : ατ > 0} be the set of consumer types that exist in the
17
population. We have |T+| ≤ |T| = ∑nj=0 C
j
n j! = ∑nj=0
n!
(n−j)! .
This consumer choice model was used previously, in a different con-
text, by Smith and Agrawal (2000). Note that the type of a customer can
result from a utility maximization procedure as in Mahajan and van Ryzin
(2001). Let U(x, j) be utility assigned by customer x to product j for j =
1, ..., n. Without loss of generality we assume that the utility from not pur-
chasing anything is zero, i.e., U(x, 0) = 0. Let U(x, [k]) be the k-th greatest
value in {U(x, 0), U(x, 1), ..., U(x, n)}, the type of customer x is (τ1, ..., τm) if
U(x, τk) = U(x, [k]) for k = 1, ..., m and U(x, 0) = U(x, [m + 1]).
Most of the consumer choice models used in the operations man-
agement literature until now, such as the Multinomial Logit model and the
locational choice model, are special cases of this model which are obtained
by adding constraints on (ατ , τ ∈ T).
Let T ⊆ N. We define Z(T) to be the |T| × n matrix which shows the
product that customers of each type buy when faced with consideration set
T, i.e., Zτ,j(T) is equal to 1 if customers of type τ choose product j from set
T and zero otherwise. We have:
Zτ,j(T) =
{
1 if j ∈ T, ∃i : τi = j and τ1, ..., τi−1 /∈ T,
0 otw.
Let Rj(T) denote the proportion of customers who would pick j out





It follows from the definition of Zτ,j(T) that Rj(T) = 0 if j /∈ T. However,
note that it is possible that j ∈ T and Rj(T) = 0. Let R0(T) = 1−∑j∈T Rj(T)
denote the proportion of customers who do not pick anything from consid-
eration set T.
The following properties of the Rj(·) function are useful:
• [(P1)] Adding a product to the consideration set does not increase the
proportion of customers who pick an existing product and it does not
decrease it by more than the proportion of customers picking the new
product: ∀j /∈ T, Ri(T) ≥ Ri(T ∪ {j}) ≥ Ri(T)− Rj(T ∪ {j}) for all
i ∈ T,
• [(P2)] Adding a product to the consideration set does not increase the
proportion of customers who do not pick anything ∀j /∈ T, R0(T) ≥
R0(T ∪ {j}) or equivalently, ∑i∈T∪{j} Ri(T ∪ {j}) ≥ ∑i∈T Ri(T).
Expected profit function
Let rj be the selling price of product j and cj be its purchasing cost.
We assume that the price and cost parameters are fixed. Let πj = (rj −
cj) denote the profit margin on product j. Without loss of generality we
normalize the expected number of customers who come to the store to one.
Let S ⊆ N be the assortment chosen by the firm, that is the menu of
products customers can choose from. We assume that there is no penalty
cost when customers substitute to a product which is not their first choice.
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Given an assortment S, the expected demand for product j is equal to Rj(S).









Before we consider the optimization problem, it is useful to analyze
the impact of modifying an existing assortment on expected profit. Let
Cj(S) be the change in expected profit obtained when adding (removing)
product j to (from) set S for j /∈ S (j ∈ S). We have Cj(S) = EΠ(S ∪ {j})−
EΠ(S\{j}).
For j /∈ S it reduces to:
Cj(S) = EΠ(S ∪ {j})−EΠ(S),
= ∑
i∈S∪{j}












(Ri(S)− Ri(S ∪ {j})(πj − πi).
In the last expression, the first term is the change in expected profit





−∑i∈S(Ri(S)− Ri(S ∪ {j})) ≥ 0. The second term corresponds to the im-
pact on expected profit due to customers switching from product i ∈ S to j
(the cannibalization effect). By (P1), (Ri(S)− Ri(S ∪ {j})) ≥ 0, but (πj − πi)
can be either positive or negative. Hence, while the new demand effect is
always positive, the cannibalization effect can be either positive or negative.
It follows that adding product j to set S increases expected profit either if
(1) the cannibalization effect is positive or if (2) the new demand effect is
greater than the cannibalization effect in absolute value.
3.1.2 Results for the General Model
In theory, it is always possible to find an optimal assortment by enu-
merating the expected profit for all the possible assortments, however, this
‘brute force’ method is very impractical for large values of n. Hence, we
look for an efficient method to find an optimal solution, by efficient we
mean a method whose complexity is less than O(2n). In identifying the
optimal assortment, the firm is concerned about two main characteristics of
products in the assortment: profitability and popularity; the profitability of
product j is measured by its profit margin πj. Measuring the popularity of
product j, independently of the assortment offered, is more difficult. We
propose two measures: Rj({j}) and Rj(N). The first one is the percentage
of customers who choose product j if it is the only option while the second
one is the percentage of customer who pick product j from a full assortment
N. Note that the two measures of popularity do not usually give the same
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ranking of the n products. Also, in practice, the products that score high on
the profitability measure may not necessarily score high on the popularity
measures and vice versa. The following example illustrates this.
Example 1: Let n = 4. Suppose π1 = 10 π2 = 8, π3 = 4, π4 = 2, ατ = 14 if
τ ∈ {(4, 1, 2), (4), (2, 4, 1), (4, 3)}. The following table shows the measures
of popularity for the four products.
1 2 3 4
Rj({j}) 1/2 1/2 1/4 1
Rj(N) 0 1/4 0 3/4
We see that the two popularity measures do not give the same rankings and these
two rankings are different from the profitability ranking. The following table shows
the expected profit associated with each possible assortment.
S EΠ(S) S EΠ(S) S EΠ(S) S EΠ(S)
{1} 5 {1,2} 4.5 {2,4} 5 {1,3,4} 4
{2} 4 {1,3} 6.5 {3,4} 4 {2,3,4} 5
{3} 1.5 {1,4} 4 {1,2,3} 5.5 {1,2,3,4} 5
{4} 4 {2,3} 5.5 {1,2,4} 5
The optimal assortment is S∗ = {1, 3} and the optimal expected profit is 6.5.
Example 1 illustrates that an optimal assortment need not contain the most
popular product (product 4 is not in S∗). Notice that product 2 is both more
profitable and more popular than product 3, since π2 > π3, R2(N) > R3(N)
and R2({2}) > R3({3}) and yet the optimal solution contains product 3.
This example also shows that it is not possible to eliminate some products
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from consideration based on some efficient frontier-type reasoning using
the popularity and profitability dimensions.
Proposition 3.1.1. Let M = {j ∈ N : πj = maxi∈N πi}. There exists an optimal
initial assortment S∗ such that M ⊆ S∗.
Proposition 3.1.1 shows that it is always optimal to include the most
profitable products in the assortment. In Example 2, we consider a greedy
algorithm on Cj(S) where product j with the highest Cj(S) > 0 is added to
an assortment iteratively and show that it does not necessarily result in an
optimal solution. Example 1 and Example 2 illustrate that products interact
in a complex manner in our general consumer choice model, so that there is
no simple structure to the optimal assortment(s).
Example 2: Let n = 4. Suppose π1 = 4, π2 = π3 = 2 and π4 = 1, ατ = 14
if τ ∈ {(1), (4, 3), (3, 2, 1), (2)}. A greedy algorithm would give S = {1, 4}
as C1(∅) = 2 > C2(∅) = C3(∅) = 1 > C4(∅) = 1/4 and C4({1}) = 0.25 >
C2({1}) = C3({1}) = 0. We have EΠ({1, 4}) = 2.25. However stocking
{1, 2, 3} gives a higher expected profit, i.e. EΠ({1, 2, 3}) = 2.5.
Lemma 3.1.2. Let T = N\M. Let I and O be such that
I = M ∪









There exists an optimal solution S∗ such that I ⊆ S∗ ⊆ (N\O).
23
In other words, products in I should be included in the solution be-
cause these are products that increase expected profit when added to every
assortment that contains M and products in O can be removed from con-
sideration because these are products that always decrease expected profit
when added to an existing assortment that contains M. Now, we can fo-
cus on searching for an optimal assortment amongst all sets S such that






But then, it is possible to update the definition of sets I and O by using
this tighter condition on the set S, as shown in the following Lemma. By
definition I(O) is the set of those products which when added to any as-
sortment increases(decreases) the expected profit of the assortment. This
justifies the inclusion of I and exclusion of O from the optimal assortment.
Let f minj (I, O, T) ( f
max
j (I, O, T)) be a lower (upper) bound on the minimum
(maximum) change in expected profit obtained from adding product j to a
set S that contains I and does not include any product in O. We provide an
algorithm here to iteratively update the sets I/O/T using f minj (I, O, T) and
f maxj (I, O, T) .
Lemma 3.1.3. Given sets I and O, let T = N\(I ∪O). We update sets I and O
24
using
I := I ∪




O := O ∪




There exists an optimal solution S∗ such that I ⊆ S∗ ⊆ (N\O).
It follows that the sets I and O can be updated until no product in
T = N\(I ∪O) can be added to either of the two sets. We formalize the
process with the following algorithm.
In-Out Algorithm:
• Step 0: I := M, O := ∅, T := N\M, Change:=1.
• Step 1: While Change=1,
– Change:=0,
– for all j ∈ T,
∗ Compute f minj (I, O, T).
∗ If f minj (I, O, T) ≥ 0
then { I := I ∪ {j}, T := T\{j}, Change:=1. }
Else
{ Compute f maxj (I, O, T).
If f maxj (I, O, T) ≤ 0
then { O := O ∪ {j}, T := T\{j}, Change:=1. } }
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where






















Proposition 3.1.4. Let I, O and T be the sets given by the In-Out Algorithm.
There exists an optimal assortment S∗, such that I ⊆ S∗ ⊆ (N\O). Moreover, if
T = ∅, then I is optimal.
The following example illustrates the In-Out Algorithm.
Example 3: Let n = 4. Let π1 = 7, π2 = 3 and π3 = π4 = 2.
Let ατ = 17 for τ ∈ {(2), (3), (4), (2, 1), (3, 1), (3, 2), (4, 3)} and 0 otherwise.
The In-Out Algorithm finds an optimal assortment after 3 iterations. Table
3.1 shows the value of the I, O and T sets as well as the f minj and f
max
j func-
tions in each iteration.
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Table 3.1: Iterations of the In-Out Algorithm
Iteration I O T 1 2 3 4
1 {1} ∅ {2, 3, 4} f minj (I, O, T) / -0.143 -0.571 0.286
f maxj (I, O, T) / 0.286 0.143 0.571
2 {1, 4} ∅ {2, 3} f minj (I, O, T) / -0.143 -0.571 /
f maxj (I, O, T) / 0.286 -0.143 /
3 {1, 4} {3} {2} f minj (I, O, T) / 0.286 / /
f maxj (I, O, T) / 0.286 / /
end {1, 2, 4} {3} ∅
After the third iteration, T = ∅ so the optimal solution is I = {1, 2, 4}.
Upper bound
We obtain upper bound on the optimal expected profit, denoted UB1,
by assuming that the firm has perfect information about each customers’
types and allocates to them the product with the highest value of πj of all
products in their type.






UB1 can be improved using the sets I and O obtained with the In-Out Algo-
rithm.
Lemma 3.1.6. EΠ(S) ≤ UB2(I, O) ≤ UB1 for all S ⊆ N, where








These upper bounds are useful in proving the optimality of some of the methods
proposed for a few special cases and also help simplify the heuristics.
3.1.3 Results for special cases
In this section we consider special cases of the consumer choice model
defined in Section3.1.1.
Multinomial Logit model
In the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model (see van Ryzin and Maha-
jan (1999)for a complete description), each product is characterized by a
preference level or popularity index. Let vj be the popularity index of prod-
uct j and v0 be that of the non-purchase option. Then for j ∈ S, Rj(S) =
vj
∑i∈S vi+v0
. Note that the ranking of products based on the popularity in-
dices vj matches that based on our popularity measures Rj({j}) and Rj(N).






∑ni=0 vi − vτ1
...
vτm
∑ni=0 vi −∑m−1i=1 vτi
v0
∑ni=0 vi −∑mi=1 vτi
for all τ = (τ1, ..., τm) ∈ T
The MNL model is widely used in the literature but, it is usually
restricted to choice sets containing alternatives that are equally dissimilar
(e.g., different colors or different sizes, but not different color-size combina-
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tions)". Li, 2007 shows that for j /∈ S, (3.2) simplifies to
Cj(S) =
vj





It follows that for a given assortment S, adding product j increases ex-
pected profit if and only if πj ≥ EΠ(S). In particular, it is better to add
a very unpopular product j with πj ≥ EΠ(S) than a very popular product
k with πk < EΠ(S). Without loss of generality we assume that products
are numbered such that π1 ≥ · · · ≥ πn with ties broken arbitrarily and let
S(j) = {1, ..., j}. Li, 2007 shows that there exists j∗ such that S(j∗) is opti-
mal and j∗ satisfies πj∗ ≥ EΠ(S(j∗−1)). We strengthen this result with the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.1.7. Let j∗ be the largest integer such that πj∗ > EΠ(S(j∗−1)).
S(j∗) is an optimal assortment. Also j∗ is such that πj∗+1 > πj∗ .
It follows that when looking for an optimal assortment, it is enough
to look at the sets S(j) with j such that πj > πj−1, that is, we can ignore sets
S(j) with j such that πj = πj−1. In other words, the products with the same
value of π can be sorted arbitrarily when constructing the sets S(j), despite
the fact that they may have different popularity indices. The complexity of
the method to find an optimal assortment is O(n log n). Proposition 3.1.7
suggests that the most important dimension is the profitability of the prod-
ucts. The value of the popularity index of some of the products (vj) may not
even be considered in the algorithm. The following example illustrates this
point.
29
Example 4: Let n = 3. Let π1 = 15, π2 = 5 and π3 = 4. Let v0 = 1,
v1 = 1, v2 = 2 and v3 = x. The optimal solution is S = {1} since C2({1}) =
−1.25 < 0 irrespective of the value of x. In fact C3({1, 2}) and EΠ({1, 2, 3})
are decreasing in x. The reason is that under the MNL model, a new product
“steals" demand from the existing products proportionally to their existing
demand. Specifically, for j /∈ S, i ∈ S,
Ri(S ∪ {j}) = Ri(S)(1− Rj(S ∪ {j}) and R0(S ∪ {j}) = R0(S)(1− Rj(S ∪ {j}).
This is a well-known limitation of the MNL model called the independence
of irrelevant alternatives. The more popular a new product is, the more new
demand it brings but also, the more it cannibalizes the existing products in
the assortment, which are more profitable.
One-dimensional locational choice model
Let L be a one-dimensional attribute space. Customers are characterized by
the location of their most preferred product on this attribute space. Let G
be the distribution of customer locations on the attribute space. Let bj ∈ L
be the location of product j on the attribute space, j = 1, ..., n. Let U(x, j) be
the utility that a customer located at x ∈ L gets from buying product j,
U(x, j) = Zj − rj − d|x− bj|,
where Zj is the reservation price for product j and d > 0 is the dis-utility
associated with a distance of 1 between the customer and product locations.
We assume that there are no two products with identical values of bj, Zj and
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rj. Let Lj =
Zj−rj
d be the maximum distance between bj and a customer who
gets a non negative utility from product j. Without loss of generality, let the
non-purchase utility be equal to zero. For each type τ, let Lτ be the part of
the attribute space where customers which are of type τ = (τ1, ..., τm):
Lτ = {x ∈ L : U(x, τ1) ≥ U(x, τ2) ≥ ... ≥ U(x, τm) > 0} .




















where l1(1) = 0, l
1
(1) = 0.1, l
2
(1) = 0.3 and l
2
(1) = 0.5.
Hence, this model constitutes a special case of our general choice
model. It can be shown that if T ⊆ {τ = (τ1, ..., τm) ∈ T : maxk=1,...,m τk −
mink=1,...,m τk + 1 = m} then there exists an attribute space L and distribu-
tion G such that ατ is obtained as in (3.7). Also, |T+| ≤ ∑nj=1(n− j + 1)j!.
This model is also referred to as Lancaster demand model or Hotelling-
type demand model. It applies to product categories in which product are
horizontally differentiated on one attribute, e.g., shirts of different colors,
yogurt with different fat content, etc. Suppose, without loss of general-
ity, that the products are numbered such that b1 − L1 ≤ b2 − L2 ≤ ... ≤
bn − Ln with ties broken arbitrarily. Consider i, j ∈ N, such that i < j. If
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bi + Li ≥ bj + Lj, then every customer (weakly) prefers product i to prod-
uct j. If bi + Li < bj + Lj, some customers prefer product i to j and some
customers prefer product j to i. In this case, let a(i,j) be the location of the
customer who is indifferent between buying product i and product j,
a(i,j) =
(Li − Lj) + (bi + bj)
2
.
Lemma 3.1.8. There exists an optimal assortment S such that for all i, j ∈ S with
i < j, bi + Li < bj + Lj.
It follows that we can consider only assortments S = {s1, ..., sk} with












for j = 1,
G
(




max{a(sj−1,sj), bsj − Lsj}
)







max{a(sj−1,sj), bsj − Lsj}
)








We model the problem of finding the best assortment as a shortest
path problem. Define A to be the set of nodes where A = {(i, j) : 1 ≤ i <
j ≤ n and bi + Li < bj + Lj} ∪{(j, n + 1); j = 1, ..., n}∪{(0, 0), (n + 1, n + 1)}.
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min{a(k,l), bk + Lk}
)
− G (bk − Lk)
]
πk









max{a(i,k), bk − Lk}
)]
πk
if 0 < i < j = k < l ≤ n + 1,
0
if 0 < i < j = k = l = n + 1,
+∞
otherwise
where we set a(j,n+1) = +∞ for j = 1, ..., n.
Proposition 3.1.9. a) The problem of finding an optimal assortment reduces to a
shortest path problem between (0, 0) and (n + 1, n + 1).
b) The complexity of the method to find an optimal assortment is O(n3)
Note that, in a different context, Alptekinoglu, 2004 find a similar
structure for their problem of finding the optimal trade off between variety
and lead time.
Example 5: Let n = 3, L = [0, 1], d = 10 and G be uniform on [0, 1]. The
following table shows the parameters for the three products.
j 1 2 3
bj 0.3 0.2 0.8
Zj 5 2 4
rj 2 1 2
Lj 0.3 0.1 0.2
πj 20 10 100
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The attribute space is such that each product is associated with a
triangle. The height of the triangle for product j is Zj − rj, which is the
utility a customer located at bj gets from product j. The intersection of the
triangle with the attribute space corresponds to locations of customers who
get a positive utility from it. The length of this intersection is 2Lj.
First note that every customer prefers 1 to 2 since b1 + L1 = 0.6 >
b2 + L2 = 0.3 (graphically, the triangle corresponding to product 2 is inside
the one that corresponds to product 1) and that product 1 is more profitable
than product 2 since pi1 > π2. Yet the optimal assortment is {2, 3} so it is
not possible to eliminate products that are less preferred than a more prof-
itable product. The optimal expected profit is equal to 60. The path that
corresponds to this assortment is (0, 0)→ (2, 3)→ (3, 4)→ (4, 4).
Increasing Preferences
Under the increasing preferences model, it is possible to renumber
the products such that T+ ⊆ {τ = (τ1, ..., τm) ∈ T : τ1 < τ2 < ... < τm} so
that |T+| ≤ 2n. For example if n = 3, customers can only be of the follow-
ing types: {(1), (2), (3), (1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (1, 2, 3)}. This consumer choice
model applies to product that differ with respect to multiple attributes,
when customers are, to a certain extent, willing to accept products with
a larger (but not smaller) value of each attribute e.g., wood panels with dif-
ferent widths and lengths. An important property is that for j /∈ S, i ∈ S,
Ri(S ∪ {j}) = Ri(S) if j > i. (3.10)
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In other words, a new product only “steals" demand from products with a
higher index. For this model we get the following result which often helps
speed the search for the optimal solution.
Lemma 3.1.10. There exists an optimal assortment that contains the set G = {j :
πj ≥ πi for all i > j}.
In other words, products that can only cannibalize less profitable
products should be included in the assortment. The optimal solution can
be found by comparing the 2n−|G| − 1 assortments in which G is included.
Note that n ∈ G and M ⊆ G so |G| ≥ 1.
Partial one-way substitution
Under partial one-way substitution, it is possible to renumber the
products such that T+ ⊆ {τ = (τ1, ..., τm) ∈ T : τk = τk−1 + 1 for k =
2, ..., m}. Hence, |T + | ≤ n(n+1)2 . For example if n = 3, customers can only
be of the following types:
{(1), (2), (3), (1, 2), (2, 3), (1, 2, 3)}
This consumer choice model applies to products that differ with respect
to one attribute, when customers are, to a certain extent, willing to accept
products with a larger (but not smaller) value of the attribute e.g., table-
cloths of different lengths or adjustable shower rods with different maxi-
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We model the problem of finding the best assortment as a shortest path
problem. Let A be the set of nodes, where A = {0, 1, ..., n}. The cost of arcs
are defined as follows, for i, j ∈ A:
ci,j =

−Rj({i, j})πj if 0 < i < j ≤ n,
−Rj({j})πj if i = 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
+∞ otw.
Proposition 3.1.11. a) The problem of finding an optimal assortment reduces to a
shortest path problem between nodes 0 and n.
b) The complexity of the method to find an optimal assortment is O(n2).
Full one-way substitution
Under full one-way substitution, it is possible to renumber the prod-
ucts such that T+ ⊆ {τ = (τ1, ..., τm) ∈ T : τk = n− (m− k) for k = 1, ..., m}.
Hence, |T+| ≤ n. For example if n = 3, customers can only be of the follow-
ing types: {(1, 2, 3), (2, 3), (3)}.
This consumer choice model is similar in its application to the par-
tial one-way substitution model except that customers are always willing
to accept a substitute product with a larger (but not smaller) value of the
attribute.
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Proposition 3.1.12. The set S∗ = {j : πj ≥ πi, for all i > j} is an optimal
assortment.
Note that the optimal assortment(s) does (do) not depend on the ac-
tual proportion of customers that are of each type ατ for τ ∈ T+ and is (are)
such that every customer is satisfied. The complexity of the method to find
an optimal assortment is O(n).
Homogeneous population
Under homogeneous population model, it is possible to renumber
the products such that T+ ⊆ {τ = (τ1, ..., τm) ∈ T : τk = k for k = 1, ..., m}.
Hence, |T+| ≤ n. For example if n = 3, customers can only be of the fol-
lowing types: {(1), (1, 2), (1, 2, 3)}. This consumer choice model applies to
product categories for which all customers agree on the ranking of products
but they differ in their willingness to substitute, e.g. DVDs with more or less
special features and/or special packaging offered at the same price.
Lemma 3.1.13. S∗ = {k} such that Rk({k})πk = maxj Rj({j})πj is an optimal
assortment.
Universal backup model
Under the universal backup model, it is possible to renumber the
products such that T+ ⊆ {τ = (τ1, ..., τm) ∈ MT : m ≤ 2 and τm =
n}. Hence, |T+| ≤ n. Without loss of generality n is the backup prod-
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uct. For example if n = 3, customers can only be of the following types:
{(1, 3), (2, 3), (3)}.
This consumer choice model applies to categories for which every
customers differ in their first choice but everyone has the same second choice:
such as the example of ice cream (Mahajan and van Ryzin, 2001) where “ev-
ery customer may be willing to settle for vanilla ice cream if their favorite
flavor is out of stock".
Proposition 3.1.14. S∗ =
{
j ∈ T : πj ≥ πn
}
is an optimal assortment.
Like in the full one-way substitution model, the optimal assortment(s)
does (do) not depend on the actual proportion of customers that are of each
type ατ for τ ∈ T+ and that is (are) such that every customer is satisfied.
Markovian second choice
Under Markovian second choice model, it is possible to renumber
the products such that T+ ⊆ {τ = (τ1, ..., τm) ∈ T : m ≤ 2. For example if
n = 3, customers can only be of the following types: {(1), (2), (3), (1, 2), (1, 3),
(2, 1), (2, 3), (3, 1), (3, 2)}. This consumer choice model applies to product
categories with high brand loyalty, where every customer is willing to buy
at most two products.
We are not able to find an efficient method to get this optimal solution
in this model. However we are able to get good results using a simplified
version of the In-Out Algorithm. See 3.2 for some numerical results.
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Lemma 3.1.15. Consider the In-Out Algorithm from 3.3 with f minj (I, O, U) =
Cj (N\(O ∪ {j})) and f maxj (I, O, U) = Cj(I). There exists an optimal assortment
S∗ such that I ⊆ S∗. Moreover if T = ∅, then I is optimal.
The complexity of the In-Out Algorithm with these values is O(n2).
See Example 3 for an application of the In-Out Algorithm with the Marko-
vian second choice model.
Summary and insights
Figure 3.1 provides a summary of our results. An arrow from one
model to another indicates that the bottom one is a special case of the top
one, e.g., the homogeneous population model is a special case of the one-
way substitution model. Boxes in gray indicate that we have an efficient
method (other than enumeration) to obtain an optimal solution.
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Figure 3.1: Summary of Results for Special Cases
Analyzing the special cases also teaches us some valuable insights
about the assortment decision. In models where substitution occurs be-
tween every pair of products, such as the MNL model and the varying
degrees of substitution model, the guiding principle for constructing the
assortment is the absolute profitability of the products, as measured by their
profit margin. If, in contrast, substitution is only localized or one-directional,
as in the locational choice, out tree, partial and full one-way substitution
and the homogeneous population models, then it is important to under-
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stand which products are cannibalized by the inclusion of a new product to
the assortment and compare their relative profitability.
Also we learned that if the proportion of customers that want to buy
product j from any assortment S only depends on a subset of S, as in the
one-dimensional locational, out tree and partial one-way substitution mod-
els then the problem of finding an optimal assortment can be found using
dynamic programming.
3.2. Heuristics and Numerical Results
3.2.1 Heuristics
For the general consumer choice model as well as the special cases
for which we do not have an efficient method of finding an optimal so-
lution (increasing preferences and Markovian second choice), we resort to
heuristics. We propose the following 6 heuristics. Each heuristic requires
the specification of sets I and O, which may be obtained from the In-Out
Algorithm if it is run beforehand. If not, I and O are set equal to M and ∅
respectively, except for the increasing preference model where I is set equal
to G by Lemma 3.1.10.
Greedy-add (GA) heuristic:
• Step 0: S1 = I, T = N\(I ∪O), k = 1.
• Step 1: While T 6= ∅,
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– Find j = max{i ∈ T : Ci(Sk) = maxl∈T Cl(Sk)}.
– T := T\{j}, Sk = Sk−1 ∪ {j}, k = k + 1.
• Step 2: Find S is such that EΠ(S) = maxk EΠ(Sk).
Greedy-remove (GR) heuristic:
• Step 0: S1 = (N\O), T = ∅, k = 1.
• Step 1: While T 6= N\(I ∪O),
– Find j = max{i ∈ (Sk\I) : Ci(Sk) = maxl∈(Sk\I) Cl(Sk)}.
– T := T ∪ {j}, Sk = Sk−1\{j}, k = k + 1.
• Step 2: Find S is such that EΠ(S) = maxk EΠ(Sk).
Largest marginal profit (LMP) heuristic: This algorithm is identical to the
Greedy-add Algorithm except that Cj(Sk) is replaced by Bj(Sk) which, for
j /∈ Sk, is the marginal benefit of product j when added to set Sk, i.e., the
change in expected profit per extra unit of demand,
Bj(Sk) =
EΠ(Sk ∪ {j})−EΠ(Sk)
R0(Sk)− R0(Sk ∪ {j})
=
Cj(Sk)
R0(Sk)− R0(Sk ∪ {j})
.
This algorithm is inspired by the “largest marginal benefit" Algorithm of
Talluri and van Ryzin (2004).
The most profitable ones (MP) heuristic: First renumber the prod-
ucts in N\(I ∪O) such that π1 ≥ π2 ≥ ... ≥ πñ where ñ = |N\(I ∪O)|. Let
Sk = {1, ..., k}. Find S is such that EΠ(I ∪ S) = maxk EΠ(I ∪ Sk).
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The most popular ones using Rj(N) (MPa) heuristic: This heuristic
is similar to the previous one except the products in N\(I ∪O) are renum-
bered with respect to Rj(N).
The most popular ones using Rj({j}) (MPf) heuristic: This heuristic
is similar to the previous one except the products in N\(I ∪O) are renum-
bered with respect to Rj({j}).
The complexity of the GA, GR and MB heuristics is O(n2) while that
of the MP, MPa and MPf heuristics is O(n log n). The following example
shows that none of these heuristic always gives the optimal solution for
the increasing preferences model of 3.1.3, for the Markovian second choice
model of 3.1.3 and hence also for the general consumer choice model .
Example: Let n = 6. Let π1 = 9, π2 = 8, π3 = 16, π4 = 14, π5 = 19 and
π6 = 3. Let T+ =
{(2), (5), (1, 2), (1, 4), (1, 6), (2, 3), (2, 5), (2, 6), (3, 4), (3, 6), (4, 5), (5, 6)},
which satisfies the conditions of the increasing preferences and Markovian
second choice models. Let ατ is given by the following table:
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The following table shows the solutions given by the 6 heuristics
with I = G = {5, 6} and O = ∅.
S EΠ(S)
GA {3, 4, 5, 6} 12.10
GR {3, 4, 5, 6} 12.10
LMP {3, 4, 5, 6} 12.10
MP {3, 4, 5, 6} 12.10
MPa {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} 11.15
MPf {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} 11.15
The optimal assortment is S∗ = {1, 3, 5, 6} and EΠ(S) = 12.35.
Note that if we run the In-Out Algorithm prior to running the 6
heuristics then we would obtain I = {3, 5, 6} and O = ∅. Using these
values in the 6 heuristics, GA, GR and MPf find the optimal solution, the
other three still do not.
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3.2.2 Numerical results
We test the performance of the In-Out Algorithm and of our six heuris-
tics using 2 scenarios. Each scenario has 6 simulation rounds which differ in
the number of potential products n. In each simulation round, we use 10,000
problem instances where the parameters are randomly generated. The val-
ues of πj are generated using independent discrete uniform distributions
between 0 and 20, for j = 1, ...n.
In Scenario 1, we use the Markovian second choice model 3.1.3 to
represent customer preferences. In this case, the values of ατ are generated
as follows. First we generate a uniform random integer number x between
n and n2, because |T+| ≤ n2 in this model. Then we generate ατ for all
τ = (τ1, ..., τm) such that m ≤ 2, using a multinomial distribution with x
trials and a probability of success for each type equal to 1/x. The results for
Scenario 1 are presented in Table 3.2
In Scenario 2, we use the increasing preferences model. In this case,
the values of ατ are generated in a similar fashion. First we generate a uni-
form random integer number x between n and 2n− 1, because |T+| ≤ 2n− 1
in this model. Then we generate ατ for all τ = (τ1, ..., τm) such that τ1 <
τ2 < ... < τm, using multinomial distribution with x trials and a proba-
bility of success for each type equal to 1/x. The results for Scenario 2 are
presented in Table 3.3.
In theory, it is always possible to obtain an optimal assortment for a
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given problem instance by enumerating all 2n−|M| − 1 possible assortments
and looking for the best one. However, this method is too computationally
intensive for large value of n (for n = 20 it takes more than 8 hours per
problem instance in scenario 2). By Proposition 3.1.4, the In-Out Algorithm
provides an optimal solution if it terminates with T = ∅. If it does not,
and the number of products left in the T set is small enough, an optimal
assortment can be found by enumerating all 2|T| possible assortments which
include I and finding the best one. Failing that, we know the solution of
one of the 6 heuristics is optimal if its expected profit is equal to one of the
upper bounds. If none of these conditions is satisfied then we do not know
what the optimal solution(s) is (are). In Tables 3.2 and 3.3 we report, for
each round, the percentage of instances in which we know that an optimal
assortment was found (OPT % known).
For the In-Out Algorithm (IO), we report the percentage of instances
in which the algorithm found an optimal solution (% opt) as well as average
number of products that were left in the T set after the algorithm was run
(Avg left).
For the 6 heuristics, we report the percentage of instances in which
the solution obtained was optimal (% opt) as well as the average and maxi-
mum optimality gaps as measured by (Optimal Expected Profit - Expected
Profit of heuristic)/Optimal Expected Profit (Avg % OG and Max % OG).
To better understand the benefits of the In-Out Algorithm we report
the performance of the 6 heuristics before and after its use. In other words,
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we first run the 6 heuristics with I = M in Scenario 1 or I = G in Scenario 2
and O = ∅ (pre). Then we run them again using the sets I and O obtained
by the In-Out Algorithm (post).
In Scenario 1, (see Table 3.2) we obtained an optimal assortment in
Scenario 1 for all but 23 problem instances. The In-Out Algorithm reached
the optimal solution in 78.63% of the problem instances but its performance
worsens with the number of products. It is generally fast (thanks to Proposi-
tion 3.1.15) and it significantly improves the performance of all 6 heuristics.
The best heuristic for this model is GR, it reaches an optimal solution for
about 98.60% of problem instances before the In-Out Algorithm and 99.15%
of them after. The performance of all 6 heuristics gets worse as n increases.
In Scenario 2, (see Table 3.3) it was more difficult to obtain an optimal
assortment (only 84.62% of the problem instances) as the set T+ is generally
larger in the increasing preferences model compared to the Markovian sec-
ond choice model. The In-Out Algorithm does not perform as well as in
Scenario 1 and its average CPT is higher. However it continues to improve
the performance of all 6 heuristics, though not as much as in Scenario 1. The
best heuristic is GA, it reaches an optimal solution for 99.69% of the prob-
lem instances before the In-Out Algorithm and 99.71% of them after. Sur-
prisingly, the performance of the best three heuristics (GA, GR and LMP)
improves with n.
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Table 3.2: Performance Analysis for Markovian Second Choice
n=5 n=10 n=15 n=20
OPT % known 100 100 100 99.77
% opt 87.14 78.08 74.43 72.61
IO Avg left 0.30 0.68 0.91 1.06
Avg CPT 0.00 0.05 0.18 0.44
pre post pre post pre post pre post
% opt 97.83 99.67 96.22 99.02 94.68 98.41 94.24 98.18
GA Avg % OG 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.01
Max % OG 23.38 8.28 10.59 3.24 11.66 2.31 8.28 1.92
Avg CPT 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.73 0.01
% opt 99.69 99.76 98.68 99.16 97.96 98.77 97.65 98.62
GR Avg % OG 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Max % OG 5.34 5.34 3.56 3.53 4.37 2.62 1.92 1.61
Avg CPT 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.83 0.01
% opt 96.56 98.62 94.11 96.96 92.81 96.29 92.21 95.89
LMP Avg % OG 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
Max % OG 10.00 6.67 3.30 3.30 3.28 3.28 2.38 1.88
Avg CPT 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.73 0.02
% opt 75.04 95.22 52.53 89.84 40.62 86.19 33.67 83.89
MP Avg % OG 1.00 0.14 1.01 0.14 0.93 0.11 0.86 0.09
Max % OG 25.00 16.18 18.37 8.89 14.14 6.91 15.81 4.20
Avg CPT 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00
% opt 26.25 93.27 1.53 86.29 0.00 82.85 0 80.53
MPa Avg % OG 8.44 0.28 11.57 0.28 12.38 0.24 13.03 0.09
Max % OG 63.83 51.04 52.76 20.38 43.59 11.66 37.84 7.30
Avg CPT 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.01
% opt 24.15 92.19 1.39 85.12 0.00 81.97 0 80.09
MPf Avg % OG 9.65 0.40 12.62 0.35 13.20 0.28 13.69 0.21
Max % OG 73.33 51.04 58.05 28.03 46.15 14.93 48.50 13.30
Avg CPT 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.18 0.01
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Table 3.3: Performance Analysis for Increasing Preferences
n=5 n=7 n=9 n=11
OPT % known 100 100 100 71.27
% opt 43.81 10.26 1.87 0.35
IO Avg left 1.61 3.81 5.86 7.65
Avg CPT 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.31
pre post pre post pre post pre post
% opt 99.73 99.78 99.37 99.40 99.57 99.57 99.79 99.80
GA Avg % OG 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max % OG 16.67 16.67 14.29 6.90 6.35 6.35 1.75 0.67
Avg CPT 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.31 0.31
% opt 99.57 99.66 99.30 99.34 98.56 99.59 99.65 99.68
GR Avg % OG 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Max % OG 50.33 42.48 16.67 16.67 12.77 12.77 1.97 1.97
Avg CPT 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.31 0.31
% opt 99.14 99.38 98.81 98.96 99.01 99.03 99.40 99.41
LMP Avg % OG 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Max % OG 12.20 12.20 20.72 8.98 4.95 4.95 6.64 6.64
Avg CPT 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.31 0.31
% opt 88.94 93.23 79.92 82.46 70.30 71.19 60.46 60.80
MP Avg % OG 0.39 0.22 0.43 0.37 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.48
Max % OG 25.00 18.29 16.98 12.05 12.95 12.95 11.06 11.06
Avg CPT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08
% opt 62.71 75.09 36.62 42.76 23.02 24.75 20.56 21.17
MPa Avg % OG 3.59 2.36 5.27 4.74 6.02 5.90 3.93 3.87
Max % OG 68.33 68.33 53.74 53.74 47.36 47.36 41.18 29.33
Avg CPT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.14
% opt 60.19 72.82 34.17 40.28 21.74 23.41 19.91 20.54
MPf Avg % OG 3.59 2.99 6.51 5.94 7.14 7.00 4.17 4.12
Max % OG 68.33 68.33 57.39 53.74 52.13 52.13 46.15 38.35
Avg CPT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.14
In general, we recommend using the In-Out Algorithm first to obtain
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the sets I, O and T. Then, if set T is still large, we recommend using the GA
and GR heuristics, otherwise we suggest using the brute force approach. We
never recommend using the ranking-based heuristics (MP, MPa and MPf)
as they generally perform badly, especially when n is large.
3.3. Managerial Implications and Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the problem of finding an optimal assortment in
an efficient manner for a make-to-order firm in the face of a heterogeneous
customer population is not an easy task. With a general consumer choice
model, i.e., without any constraint on the number of customers of each type,
we can only show that the optimal assortment(s) include(s) the most prof-
itable product(s). However, for a number of commonly used special cases,
we are able to find an optimal assortment with an efficient method. Our re-
sults suggest that for models where substitution occurs between every pair
of products the guiding principle for constructing the assortment is the ab-
solute profitability of the products, as measured by their profit margin. If, in
contrast, substitution is only localized or one-directional, then the guiding
principle is that of relative profitability. For the increasing preferences and
Markovian second choice models, we did not find an efficient method to
get an optimal solution but we recommend using the In-Out Algorithm first,
then the GA or GR heuristics as they proved to perform well numerically.
Our consumer choice model captures a wide range of substitution
patterns amongst products. However one of our limiting assumptions is
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that we assume that customer preferences can be fully described indepen-
dently of the assortment offered by the firm. As a result, we are not able to
capture situations in which customers are more likely to buy a given prod-
uct if it is offered in a large assortment than in a small assortment because
the large assortment provides them with the reassurance that their choice
is the right one. Also, our model does allow a new product to increase
the purchase probability of the existing products, for example, because the
existing products compare favorably to the new one. Finally we do not cap-
ture situations in which adding new products beyond a certain point creates
confusion in the mind of customers who become less likely to make a pur-
chase. These more complex product interactions will be the subject of our
future research.
Another limiting assumption is the make-to-order setting. However,
finding an optimal assortment in a make-to-stock setting is even more dif-
ficult for two reasons. First, the inventory of some products may run out
during the selling season and this affects the choice behavior of subsequent
customers who have to choose from a subset of the initial assortment. This
phenomenon is called stock-out based substitution. In this case, the demand
for a product not only depends on the initial assortment, but also on the
inventory level of the other products. Also, the profit value depends on the
sequence in which customers come to the store, and this greatly complicates
the model (see Mahajan and van Ryzin, 2001 for more details). Second, even
if we ignore stock-out based substitution by forcing customers to choose
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from the initial assortment (a.k.a. assuming assortment-based substitution),
the problem is more complex because inventory costs depend on the vari-
ability of the demand. To illustrate this, let D be the random variable of the
number of customers coming to the store and assume that it is Poisson with
mean λ. For a given assortment S, each customer has a probability Rj(S)
of picking product j, therefore the demand for product j is Poisson with
mean λRj(S). In a News vendor setting, the inventory costs increase pro-
portionately to the standard deviation of demand, that is
√
λRj(S). Hence
the profit contribution of a product is an increasing convex function of its
demand. Unfortunately all of our (positive) results no longer hold in this
case because there is an incentive to stock fewer products and increase their
demand in order to save on inventory costs. However, if we assume that de-
mand for product j is equal to Rj(S)D (which is equivalent to assuming that






rjE[min(q∗j , D)]− cjq∗j
]
, (3.12)
where q∗j is in the optimal inventory for product j. Note that (3.12) is equiva-
lent to (3.1) with πj =
[
rjE[min(q∗j , D)]− cjq∗j
]
. Hence, it follows that all of
our results apply to a make-to-stock setting if (1) there is no stock-out based
substitution and (2) demand has a coefficient of variation equal to 1. To the
best of our knowledge, finding an optimal assortment in a make-to-stock
setting with stock-out based substitution and a coefficient of variation less
than one is still an open problem.
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Another possible extension of our model is to include a penalty cost
for customers who do not get their first choice product. Let rτ,j be the price
paid by a customer of type τ for product j. For example, one can set:
rτ,j =
{
rj if τ1 = j,
rj − b otw.
where b is some fixed discount given to customers who have to substitute.






All of our (positive) results no longer hold in this case as well because the
profit margin on a product now depends on the assortment offered. Hence,




Durable Products, Time inconsistency, and
Lock-in
4.1. Introduction
There are many durable products for which manufacturers have de-
vised clever ways of charging consumers based on the amount of use that
they derive from the product. Typically, this is done by selling contingent
products or services. For example, printers do not print without ink car-
tridges, commercial aircraft do not fly without replacement parts, etc. Even
some sophisticated business application software is nearly impossible to
use without expensive consulting and maintenance services. Of course, this
strategy which has often been colorfully referred to as, giving away the ra-
zor to make money from selling blades, has been widely recognized as a viable
business strategy.
There are many ways in which the strategy of locking consumers into
contingent products and services can be implemented in practice. When
Iomega revolutionized the information storage industry by introducing its
Zip drive in 1994, it initially monopolized the market for Zip disks, which
were the contingent storage medium that was required to use the Zip drive.
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But later, these disks were also sold by Fuji, Verbatim, Toshiba, and Max-
ell. This strategy of initially monopolizing the market for contingent con-
sumables and later allowing competition is not uncommon. In fact, while
Gillette typically monopolizes the sales of blades for its most recently intro-
duced razor, it is not uncommon to find generic blade suppliers for older
razors. Yet many other firms maintain monopoly control over contingent
consumables for extended periods. For example, Abbott Labs remains the
sole source of test strips for its FreeStyle glucose monitors; Apple makes
it difficult for consumers to down-load music from web-sites other than
iTunes; and many consumer electronics products are compatible with only
proprietary peripheral add-ons and accessories.
Our interest is in understanding when a firm should employ a lock-
in strategy and, if so, how it can be tailored to particular circumstances. We
focus on how a strategy of locking-in consumers to a contingent consumable
product / service affects the interactions between a durable goods manufac-
turer and strategic consumers. In particular, we consider the following two
related concerns that affect the purchasing decisions of strategic consumers:
First, as is the case for many durable products, consumers worry about the
potential for the price of the durable to decline after they purchase. This
concern is related to the manufacturer’s incentive to reduce prices after sell-
ing to the consumers with the highest valuations. In the extreme, it implies
that a monopolist’s ability to set a price above marginal cost is inconsistent
with her own incentives and the passage of time. Consequently, it is often
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referred to as time inconsistency. Second, consumers are concerned about the
extent to which they will be able to derive utility from the durable product
after they purchase; for example, consumers of Amazon’s reading device
Kindle are concerned about the availability of e-books at reasonable prices
(WIRED (2009)). When consumers are locked-in to purchasing a contingent
consumable each time they use the durable, they will be concerned about
their exposure to being held-up with respect to the price at which consum-
ables are sold.
It is well known that a durable good manufacturer can mitigate time
inconsistency by leasing her product to consumers. Under a lease, con-
sumers pay a lease fee for the right to use the product for a given period of
time but the manufacturer is the residual claimant who owns the product
at the end of the lease. Because this eliminates the durable good manufac-
turer’s incentive to reduce price over time it mitigates time inconsistency
and allows the manufacturer to earn rents comparable to those in a non-
durable good monopoly.
The strategy of locking consumers into a contingent consumable prod-
uct bears some superficial similarity to a lease since both approaches endow
the manufacturer with the ability to charge consumers based on their use of
a durable. However, there is a significant distinction: With a lease, con-
sumers pay according to the amount of time for which they have access to
the durable, whereas with lock-in, they pay according to their utilization of
the durable. Thus, a lock-in policy allows a manufacturer to charge con-
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sumers according to their frequency of use. Because of this distinction, and
because of the fact that lock-in policies are observed frequently in practice,
it is of interest to better understand the role of these policies in the presence
of strategic consumers.
As we will see, a policy of locking consumers into a contingent con-
sumable creates an interesting balance between the two main concerns of
strategic consumers, i.e. time inconsistency and hold-up. On the one hand,
the opportunity to sell consumables to the highest valuation consumers can
reduce the manufacturer’s incentive to reduce the price of its durable over
time. Thus, lock-in can help to mitigate the time inconsistency effect. On
the other hand, in order for the manufacturer to make its durable attractive
to consumers with lower valuations, she will have an incentive to continue
to offer contingent consumables at reasonable prices. Thus, the presence of
differentiated consumers, which gives rise to time inconsistency, may also
help to mitigate hold-up issues with respect to the contingent consumable
product.
4.2. Model Description
In order to focus on products whose physical durability outlasts their
technical relevance, we adopt a variation of Bulow’s two period durable
goods model in which the product does not depreciate between periods
1 and 2. As in the original Bulow (1982) model, we require that either
the same set of consumers are present in both periods or there is a per-
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fect second-hand market. Either of these assumptions is sufficient to ensure
that all the units available in the market in period 2 are allocated to the
consumers with highest valuations.
Where our model differs from that of Bulow (1982) is that we assume
that consumers derive utility from the durable only by using it in conjunc-
tion with a contingent consumable. Specifically, we assume that one unit of
a contingent consumable is required for each instance of use of the durable
and that in each period a consumer’s marginal utility is decreasing in the
amount that he uses the durable. Let z be the amount of use that a consumer
derives from the durable product in a given period. We allow for two types
of consumers (High (h) and Low (l)) such that their marginal utilities are
U
′
h(z) = 1 − z and U
′
l(z) = α − z respectively, where α < 1. Note that
this assumption of linearly decreasing marginal utility is similar to the one
made by Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2005) in their micro model of the utility
that consumers derive from multiple units of a product that is complemen-
tary to a durable. By construction, we can see that the utilities for both type




0 (α− z)dz = αz−
z2
2
if i = l∫ z
0 (1− z)dz = z−
z2
2
if i = h
We normalize the market size to 1 and denote by θ the fraction of
consumers who are type h consumers. In any period in which a consumer
has access to the durable, he maximizes his utility by consuming it until the
58
point that his marginal utility is equal to the price at which the contingent
consumable can be obtained. Thus, if the consumable is available at price
pc, the amount of use that a consumer derives from the durable is as follows:
zi(pc) =
{
[1− pc]+ if i = h
[α− pc]+ if i = l
(4.1)
and the net utility associated with his use can be represented as follows
Vi(pc) = Ui(zi(pc))− zi(pc)pc (4.2)
In order to focus on the interaction between time inconsistency and
hold-up, we assume that the manufacturer sells, rather than leases, the
durable product. There are many reasons why manufacturers cannot lease
durable products, including the moral hazard issues that arise when the ac-
tions taken by the user of a product are not observable. This may help to
explain why leasing is not commonly observed in consumer electronics. We
recognize that if the manufacturer were to lease her durable product, then
time inconsistency could be eliminated, and the trade-off that we are to ex-
amine would not exist. However, because we often do not observe leasing
of durables that require contingent consumables, e.g. the Kindle, iPhone,
iPod, etc., our assumption that durables are sold is justified. In addition
to assuming that the durables are sold, rather than leased, we assume that
consumables are sold according to a simple linear pricing mechanism. In
practice, there are many obstacles to the use of more sophisticated forms
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of pricing (e.g. quantity discounts / bundling), including the difficulty of
preventing the resale of “broken” bundles, and consumers’ preference for
purchasing consumables as they need them instead of making a single, one-
time purchase. Finally, we assume that the contingent consumables must be
consumed in the period in which they are sold. That is, we do not allow for
the possibility that consumers will stockpile consumables that they can ei-
ther consume or sell in the future. This is most easily justified for situations
in which the contingent consumables are intangible, e.g. the songs or e-
books that a consumer may want to down-load in the future are yet to be
created.
Throughout our analysis we assume marginal costs are zero. We do
so only for ease of exposition, relaxing this to include positive marginal
costs for consumables is straight forward and does not change the funda-
mental nature of the insights we obtain in the model. However, with posi-
tive marginal cost for durables, the monopolist’s incentive to produce addi-
tional durables is decreasing in the cost of production, eventually eliminat-
ing such incentive altogether. For our results to be applicable, it is sufficient
to assume that the marginal cost of production of durables is low enough
that the low-type consumers obtain some net utility from consumption. As
is common in the durable goods literature, we assume that the performance
of the durable does not deteriorate, but we allow for second period prof-
its/utilities to be discounted at ρ ≤ 1.
In order to characterize the relationship among the prices and de-
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mands, we begin by deriving the inverse demand for consumables as a
function of the quantity of durables (Q) in use. Consumers have demand
for consumables only if they have access to a durable, and the price is be-
low their maximum marginal utility, i.e. α for type l and 1 for type h . The
cumulative quantity of durables Q ∈ [0, 1] , but it is sufficient to restrict our
attention to quantities Q ∈ {0, θ, 1}. The demand for consumables y (Q, pc)
at a given price pc given that there are Q units of the durable in the market
is as follows:
y (Q, pc) =

0 if Q = 0
θzh (pc) if Q = θ
θzh (pc) + (1− θ)zl (pc) if Q = 1
(4.3)
It follows that the market clearing price for consumables is the following
function of the quantity, Q, of durables in use and the quantity of consum-
ables, y:
pc (Q, y) =

0 if Q = 0
1− yθ if Q = θ or y ≤ (1− α)θ
θ + α(1− θ)− y otherwise
(4.4)
In order to determine the price at which durables can be sold, we
define the implicit rental price as the market clearing price at which a given
quantity of the durable could be rented in a given period. It represents the
maximum amount that the marginal consumer(s) would pay for access to
the durable for a single period of use. In each period, the implicit rental
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price, r, is a function of the quantity (Q) of durables available and the con-
sumables price (pc) and is expressed as follows:
r (Q, pc) =
Vh (pc) = (1−pc)
2
2 if Q = θ
Vl (pc) =
(α−pc)2
2 if Q = 1
(4.5)
In period 2, the market clearing price at which the durable can be sold is
simply the implicit rental price, since a consumer who buys it in period 2
obtains exactly one period of service from it. In period 1, the market clearing
price at which the durable can be sold is equal to its implicit rental price in
period 1 as given by (4.5 ), plus the discounted anticipated second period
price.
4.2.1 Unrestricted Access to Consumables
We begin our analysis by considering durables for which consumers
who have access to a unit of the durable have unrestricted access to con-
sumption. A consumer has unrestricted access to consumption after the
purchase of the durable if either no consumable is tied to consumption of
the durable or if a competitive market supplies the consumable. Durables
such as televisions and automobiles are examples in which consumables are
freely available. Note that in most of the literature on durable products, it
is typically assumed that access to the durable allows unrestricted access to
its use. By unrestricted access we mean that the consumables are obtainable
at marginal costs, which we have normalized to zero. By setting pc = 0 in
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equation (5.2), the net utility for consumers under unrestricted access can




2 if i = l
1
2 if i = h
When consumers have unrestricted access to consumables, the prob-
lem reduces to the classic problem of a durable goods monopolist, first rec-
ognized by Coase (1972) and further analyzed by Bulow (1982). The only
decision that a monopolist manufacturer has to make is the quantity of out-
put of the durable in each period. Bulow (1982) shows that the manufac-
turer has an incentive to continue to produce over time, driving down the
market price of the durable. Because strategic consumers anticipate this,
their willingness to pay decreases. This effect has been referred to as time
inconsistency, in reference to the fact that the manufacturer’s ability to ex-
tract monopolist rents is inconsistent with her own incentives over time. To
provide a basis of comparison, we will now demonstrate the effect of time
inconsistency in our framework.
Let Qt be the quantity of durables in use in period t so that Q1 =
θ or 1. In period 2, the quantity Q2 includes the Q1 units that were in use in
period 1 plus any additional sales made by the manufacturer in the second
period. The market clearing price of the durable in period t is the price
at which the lowest valuation consumer to purchase is indifferent between
buying and not buying. Thus the market clearing price in period 2 is the
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implicit rental price r(Q2, 0). The manufacturer’s profit in period 2 under
unrestricted access can be expressed as:
πU2 (Q2, Q1) = (Q2 −Q1) r (Q2, 0)
Regardless of whether Q1 = 1 or Q1 = θ, we will have that πU2 (Q2, Q1)
is maximized when Q2 (Q1) = 1 . That is in period 2 the manufacturer
always sells to the low-type consumers if she has not done so earlier, and
her conditionally optimal second period profit is:
πU2 (Q1) =
{
0 if Q1 = 1
(1− θ) α22 if Q1 = θ
In period 1, consumers anticipate reduced durable prices in period
2. The market clearing price for the durable in period 1 is the implicit rental
price of the durable in period 1 plus the discounted second period rental








if Q1 = θ
(1 + ρ) α
2
2 if Q1 = 1
First period profit of the manufacturer is πU1 (Q1) = Q1p
U
d1 (Q1) + π
U
2 (Q1)
, which can be expressed as follows:
πU1 (Q1) =
{
(1 + ρ) α
2




2 if Q1 = θ
(4.6)




a) If the manufacturer could pre-commit to her second period output, she would sell
to both groups if and only if α ≥ αU, and sell only to the high-type otherwise. All
sales will be made in period 1, and no sales would be made in period 2.
b) If the manufacturer cannot pre-commit to her second period output, then she will
sell to both groups in period 1 if and only if α ≥ αU. Otherwise, she will sell only
to the high-type consumers in period 1, but will have an unavoidable incentive to
sell to the low-type consumers in period 2.
The first part of the Lemma is obtained by using (4.5) to compare the
per-period rental income, i.e. r(Q, 0), for Q = 1 versus Q = θ. Similarly, the
second part can be shown from comparing the upper and lower branches






2 , which is
equivalent to α ≥
√
θ.
Thus, Lemma 4.2.1 demonstrates how time inconsistency plays out
in our specific framework: When the manufacturer sells her product in pe-
riod 1, her inability to pre-commit to future output levels causes her to sell to
consumers with lower valuations than she would if she could pre-commit.
Because this results in consumers anticipating a decline in price over time,
it erodes the manufacturer’s ability to extract rents from consumers who
purchase the product in the first period. Stokey (1981) and Bulow (1982)
recognize that this issue can be eliminated if the manufacturer leases her
product, and Desai and Purohit (1998) point out that any credible commit-
ment to avoid future output can serve as a means of mitigating the time
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inconsistency issue. In practice however, it is not always possible for the
manufacturer to lease her product or to find a credible way to commit to
future output levels.
It is of interest to compare the results of our model under unrestricted
access to the results of Mussa and Rosen (1978) regarding the optimal de-
sign of a product line. Recall that they obtain a classical mechanism de-
sign result in the context of designing a product line for a set of consumers
who are differentiated according to their valuation for quality. Specifically,
they find that the optimal product line will be characterized by efficiency
at the top, and downward distortion of quality at the bottom. In our context,
since unrestricted access implies that the consumable can be obtained at its
marginal cost of production, all consumers derive an efficient level of use
from the durable product in the periods for which they have access to it.
However, the manufacturer may postpone the sale of her durable to low-
type consumers to prevent cannibalization of demand from the high-type
consumers, and this is a form of downward distortion of quality. Note also
that this is similar to the results of Moorthy and Png (1992) who analyzed
the question of whether vertically differentiated products should be intro-
duced simultaneously or sequentially. They find that, once the manufac-
turer sells to the high valuation consumers, she will have no incentive to
distort the physical quality that she offers to consumers with lower valua-
tions. However, as in our model, simply postponing the availability of the
product for these low valuation consumers serves as a conceptual form of
66
downward distortion.
So far, when we have considered only the situation in which con-
sumers have free access to the consumable, our model demonstrates very
close parallels to these classic product-line design results. However, as we
will see below, under a lock-in policy in which consumers can obtain the
consumables exclusively from the durable goods manufacturer, the optimal
product line may not retain the efficiency at the top characteristic.
4.2.2 Controlled Consumption Through Lock-in
At the opposite end of the spectrum from providing unrestricted ac-
cess to consumables is a monopoly over the consumables market. Here,
we analyze the problem faced by a monopolist manufacturer of durables
who can lock-in(LI) consumers to her product through a contingent con-
sumable. In doing so we assume that the manufacturer cannot pre-commit
to its output (or the price) of either the durable or the contingent consum-
able. In practice, there are examples of manufacturers who make explicit
guarantees about the future availability of contingent consumables, e.g. re-
placement parts for aircraft, but there are also many examples in which it
would be highly impractical for a manufacturer to do so, particularly in
situations where the content of consumables that will be demanded by con-
sumers in the future has yet to be determined, e.g. e-books, video-games,
music downloads, etc.
As before, Qt denotes the quantity of consumables in use in period t
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. Let yt denote the quantity of consumables available in period t . In pe-
riod 2, the market clearing price for the consumables depends upon Q2
and y2 according to the function pc (Q2, y2) as defined in (4.3), and the
price of the durable in period 2, pd2, is given by the implicit rental price
r (Q2, pc (Q2, y2)) as defined in (4.5). In the second period, the manufac-
turer solves the following problem:
max
Q2,y2
πLI2 (Q1, Q2, y2) = (Q2 −Q1) r (Q2, pc (Q2, y2)) + y2 pc (Q2, y2) (4.7)
The solution to this problem is characterized in the following Lemma:
Lemma 4.2.2. a) If Q1 = 1, then Q∗2 (Q1) = 1, and the quantity (y
∗
2) of consum-
ables that is produced is adequate to induce both types of consumers to purchase it






. Otherwise, the market clearing price for consumables
exceeds the low-type consumers’ maximum marginal utility, i.e. pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2) ≥ α,
and low-type consumers do not consume any units of the consumable.
b) If Q1 = θ then Q∗2 (Q1) = 1 if and only if α ≥
√
θ
2(1+θ) , while Q
∗
2 (Q1) = θ
otherwise. In either case, the manufacturer produces enough units of the
consumable so that each consumer who owns a durable consumes a positive
quantity of the consumable.
c) The second period consumables price at the conditionally optimal solution, pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2),
is non-decreasing in Q1.
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d) For any Q1, the second period consumables price at the conditionally optimal
solution, pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2), is non-decreasing in θ.
The equilibrium quantities, prices of consumable and durables, and the
profits of the manufacturer are summarized in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Table 4.1: Second period quantities Q1 = 1
























Q∗2 (Q1) 1 1
















Based on Lemma 4.2.2 we can see that, when the low-type consumers







then in the second period the manufacturer sells durables to all consumers
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Table 4.2: Second period quantities Q1 = θ









2 α(1− θ) +
θ2
(1+θ)







Q∗2 (Q1) θ 1


















who do not own it already and produces enough consumables that the mar-
ket clearing price falls low enough to attract purchases from the low-type
consumer, i.e. pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2) < α. However, the implications of the Lemma are
more intriguing when the maximum marginal utility (α) of low-type con-
sumers falls into the intermediate or low range. When maximum marginal
utility is intermediate, i.e.
√
θ






, the manufacturer sells
durables to the low-type consumers if they have not purchased the durable
in period 1. However, the output of consumables is large enough to attract
purchases from low-type consumers only when they have to wait until pe-
riod 2 to acquire the durable. In this intermediate range of α, the manufac-
turer maximizes his income from consumables by restricting output so that
pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2) ≥ α. If both groups of consumers already hold the durable, this
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is precisely what she does. However, if the manufacturer postpones sell-
ing durables to low-type consumers until period 2, then she is concerned
about her income from these additional durable sales in addition to her in-
come from consumables. Because she can extract the net utility from the
low-type consumers through her durable price, she has greater incentive
to produce consumables when she waits until the second period to sell




2(1+θ) the second period consumables price is lower when Q1 = θ
than when Q1 = 1. A similar explanation can be provided for part d) of
the Lemma, which recognizes that the market clearing consumables price
is non-decreasing in the portion of high-type consumers: When there are
more high-type consumers, i.e. larger θ, a larger portion of her potential
income in period 2 is driven by consumables sales to this group. This weak-
ens the manufacturer’s incentive to increase output of consumables beyond
the quantity that maximizes the revenues from consumables sales to these
high-type consumers in order to attract additional durables (and consum-
ables) sales to low-type consumers.
Finally, when the maximum marginal utility for low-type consumers
is very low, i.e. α ≤
√
θ
2(1+θ) , the manufacturer has no reason to sell
durables to low-type consumers. As was the case, for intermediate α, if
low-type consumers already hold the durable, the manufacturer restricts
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Figure 4.1: Conditionally optimal price of consumables in Period 2
output of consumables so that these low-type consumers do not purchase
any units. The important thing to notice here is that, in contrast to the manu-
facturer’s optimal strategy under unrestricted access, the manufacturer may
not sell durables to the low-type consumers in the second period. In or-
der to protect the revenues generated by consumable sales to the high-type
consumers, the manufacturer avoids selling durables to the low-type con-
sumers. Thus, the manufacturer’s lock-in strategy not only generates rev-
enues from consumables sales, it also helps to mitigate time-inconsistency.
On the other hand, because the high-type consumers can anticipate this ra-
tioning of consumables, this creates a hold-up problem that, on its own,
should tend to decrease their willingness to pay for the durable in period 1.
To explore this issue further, let us turn our attention to the problem




πLI1 (Q1, y1) = Q1 p
LI








where the price of durable in period 1 is:
pLId1 (Q1, y1) = r (Q1, y1) + ρr (Q
∗
2 (Q1) , y
∗
2 (Q1)) (4.9)
Note that this price depends not only on the quantities of durables and con-
sumables that are made available in period 1, but also upon the consumers’
anticipation of the manufacturer’s optimal decisions in period 2. By sub-
stituting (4.4), (4.5), and the results from Table 4.2 into (4.9), we have that,
when Q1 = θ, the first period durable price can be expressed as:
pLId1 (θ, y1) =
Vh (pc (θ, y1)) +
ρ









where, regardless of the value of α, the implicit rental price in period 1 is
equal to the net utility, Vh (pc (θ, y1)), that high-type consumer obtains when
y1 consumables are made available exclusively for high-type consumers.
However, the implicit rental price for period 2 does depend upon the value
of α. For α ≤
√
θ
2(1+θ) , no additional durables are sold in the second period,
and the implicit rental price reflects the net utility, Vh (pc), that a high-type
consumer will receive from owning the product in the second period. As
shown in Lemma 4.2.2, the manufacturer will restrict her second period
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output of consumables to maximize her revenue from selling to the locked-
in high-type consumers, which will result in a market price of pc = 12 . On
the other hand, for α ≥
√
θ
2(1+θ) , consumers anticipate that durables will
be sold to low-type consumers in the second period, and the implicit rental
price in period 2 reflects the net utility, Vl (pc), that a low-type consumer
will receive from owning the durable. Recall that, when the manufacturer
sells to the low-type consumers in period 2, she increases the availability of
the consumable and extracts the low-type’s net utility through the price of
the durable, i.e. r (Q∗2 (θ) , y
∗
2 (θ)).
If Q1 = 1, the logic is similar, but since all consumers will hold the
durable in period 2, the implicit rental price for the second period always
reflects the net utility that will be received by a low-type consumer. Sub-
stituting (4.4), (4.5), and the results from Table 4.1 into (4.9), we have that,
when Q1 = 1, the first period durables price can be expressed as:
pLId1 (1, y1) =










where, regardless of the value of α, the implicit rental price in period 1
is now equal to the net utility, Vl (pc(1, y1)), that low-type consumer ob-
tains when y1 consumables are made available and both types of consumers
have access to durables. Note that, for this case of Q1 = 1, we will have
pc (y1) < α if and only if y1 > (1− α)θ. Thus, for any y1 ≤ (1− α)θ, we will
have Vl (pc (y1)) = 0. The implicit rental price for the second period can








manufacturer restricts her second period output of consumables to such an
extent that the market clearing price exceeds the maximum marginal utility
of the low-type consumers. This discourages them from consuming it and
gives them a net utility of Vl (pc (Q∗2 , y
∗







the manufacturer’s maximization of second period consumables revenue
results in a sufficient quantity of consumables that low-type consumers ob-





We can now characterize the optimal solution to the manufacturer’s
problem when she locks-in consumers of her durable to purchasing the con-
sumable exclusively from her.










< αLI(θ) < 1, such that:
• If α ≤ αLI(θ), the manufacturer sells the durable to high-type consumers
in period 1 and does not sell to low-type consumers at all , i.e. Q∗1(α, θ) =
Q∗2(α, θ) = θ.
• If αLI(θ) ≤ α ≤ αLI(θ) the manufacturer sells to high-type consumers in
period 1 and low-type in period 2, i.e. Q∗1(α, θ) = θ < Q
∗
2(α, θ) = 1.
• If α ≥ αLI(θ), the monopolist sells to all consumers in period 1, i.e. Q∗1(α, θ) =
Q∗2(α, θ)) = 1.
b) In every period, the consumable is available in sufficient quantity that the market
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clearing price falls below the maximum marginal utility of all consumers who hold
the durable.
The equilibrium prices of durable and consumables are given in Ta-
ble 3. While the manufacturer always sells durables to high-type consumers
in period 1, she may sell them to low-type consumers either in period 1, in
period 2, or not at all. When α ≤ αLI(θ), the manufacturer does not sell to
the low-type consumers in either period, which contrasts sharply with the
result that we obtained for the case of unrestricted access to the consum-
able. Recall that under unrestricted access, the manufacturer always sells to
low-type consumers in period 2 if she has not already done so in period 1
because otherwise she would not obtain any income in period 2. However,
under lock-in, if she does not sell durables to the low-type consumers in
period 2, the manufacturer can focus exclusively upon consumables sales
to high-type consumers. In fact, if she does sell additional durables in the
second period, she faces a trade-off between the consumables revenue from
high-type consumers versus the extraction of net utility from low-type con-




equilibrium price of consumables, p∗c2 (Q1 = θ) falls dramatically as a con-
sequence of the manufacturer’s sudden willingness to sell durables to low-
type consumers in period 2 in order to extract their net utility. Only when
α ≥ αLI(θ) is the manufacturer willing to compromise her revenue stream
from selling consumables alone to just the high-type consumers in order to
extract the net utility of low-type consumers by selling them durables in the
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second period.
Table 4.3: Equilibrium Prices under Lock-in
Low α ≤ αLI(θ) Medium αLI(θ) ≤ α ≤ αLI(θ) High α ≥ αLI(θ)
Period 1
pd1 18 (4 + ρ)
1




8 (4 + ρ)












When the marginal utility of low-type consumers is not sufficiently
high, i.e. α < αLI , then the manufacturer sells durables to only high-type
consumers in period 1. Otherwise, for α ≥ αLI , she sells to both groups
in period 1 because the cannibalization effect is sufficiently weak that the
manufacturer prefers not to postpone sales to the low-type consumers until
the second period.
In Figure 4.2, we can see the relationship between the equilibrium




1), and the maximum marginal
utility (α) of low-type consumers. When α ≤ αLI so that Q∗1 = θ, the manu-
facturer can use the price of the durable product to extract the full net utility
of the high-type consumers for their first period use. In order to maximize
this net utility, she produces enough consumables to drive the market clear-




1) = 0 for α ≤ α
LI . However, when α ≥ αLI
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so that Q∗1 = 1, the durable price can extract only the net utility of the low-
type consumers first period use. If she restricts output of consumables, she
lowers the size of this extractable net utility, but she more than makes up for





1) > 0 when α ∈ [α





1) > 0, the price of consumables is linearly decreasing in α.
Figure 4.2: Equilibrium price of consumables in period 1
The reason for this is that, as α increases, the low-type consumers
become more like the high-types and there is more potential net utility that
can be extracted from them. Indeed as α → 1, the manufacturer can extract
the full net utility from both high-and low-types, and maximizes these net
utilities by driving the consumables price to zero. A second, closely related
observation is that, within the range of α for which Q∗1 = 1 for both θ = 0.3
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and θ = 0.5, the first period price of consumables is larger for θ = 0.5 than
for θ = 0.3. As the portion of high-type consumers increases, the manu-
facturer shifts her emphasis away from the net utility that can be extracted
from low-type consumers toward the revenues that she earns from consum-
ables sales to high-type consumers. A third observation is that an increase
in the proportion (θ) of high-type consumers from 0.3 to 0.5 increases the
threshold, αLI , above which the manufacturer sells durables to both groups
in period 1. This reflects the fact that a larger portion of high-type con-
sumers makes the manufacturer less willing to sacrifice any of the net util-
ity that can be extracted from these consumers. Finally, we can see that
increasing the discount factor from ρ = 0.8 (the solid lines) to ρ = 1 (the
dashed lines), shifts ᾱLI slightly higher. This is a consequence of the fact
that a larger value of ρ implies less discounting of future cash flows and
this increases the manufacturer’s willingness to postpone the sales revenue
that she might earn from low-type consumers until period 2.
It is of interest to compare the structure of our results for lock-in to
our earlier results for the unrestricted access. Recall from our discussion at
the end of Section 4.2.1 that, under unrestricted access, we retain the main
features of the optimal mechanism design problem: efficiency at the top and
downward distortion of quality. However, under lock-in this is no longer
the case. Under lock-in, the price of consumables is positive in period 2,
and may also be positive in period 1 (for α > αLI). This creates downward
distortion for the low-type consumers, but it also implies that the high-type
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consumers obtain less than their efficient level of use from the durable in
at least one period. Thus, while a lock-in strategy preserves the downward
distortion property, it does not preserve efficiency at the top. Let us now
evaluate the conditions under which the strategy of lock-in dominates that
of providing unrestricted access.
Proposition 4.2.4. For a given value of θ, there exists thresholds α ≤ α such that
for α ≥ α unrestricted access dominates lock-in and for α ≤ α lock-in dominates
unrestricted access.
Figure 4.3: Profits under Unrestricted Access vs Lock-in
Although we have been unable to prove that the two thresholds in
Proposition 4.2.4 are identical, i.e. α = ᾱ, we have been unable to identify a
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counter-example in an extensive set of numerical experiments. A represen-
tative comparison of the profits for the two strategies is depicted in Figure
4.3. Recall that the primary advantage of the lock-in strategy is the role that
it plays in mitigating time inconsistency by reducing the manufacturer’s
incentive to sell durables to low-type consumers. On the other hand, a lock-
in strategy also creates a hold-up issue with respect to consumers. When
α is large, the two types of consumers are relatively homogeneous so that
time inconsistency, which is a form of demand cannibalization, is not a big
concern. Thus, the manufacturer is better off if she can allow consumers
to have unrestricted access to consumables to eliminate the hold-up issue.
On the other hand, as α decreases, the time inconsistency issue becomes in-
creasingly important. At sufficiently low values of α, the time inconsistency
issue dominates hold-up and the manufacturer is better off using a lock-in
strategy.
4.2.3 Imperfect Competition in Consumables
Thus far, we have considered two opposing ends of a spectrum of
strategies: unrestricted access and lock-in. Yet it is not uncommon to find
situations in which manufacturers adopt strategies that involve limited com-
petition in the market for consumables. For example, as mentioned earlier,
Iomega eventually allowed Fuji, Verbatim, Toshiba, and Maxell to sell Zip
disks, the contingent storage medium for its Zip drive. More recently, Ama-
zon has been leaving strong hints that it will permit non-proprietary for-
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mats for digital books to be read on its Kindle (WIRED (2009)). To assess the
question of whether some intermediate level of competition in the consum-
ables market can be beneficial to a durable goods manufacturer, we now
extend our model to allow for imperfect competition in the consumables
market.
In our extended model, we allow for competition in the consumables
market in only the second period. Note that, based on our comparison be-
tween lock-in and unrestricted access in Section 4.2.1, the main role that lock-
in plays in influencing strategic consumers is in how it affects their antici-
pation of the output quantities in the second period. As we have defined
unrestricted access, the manufacturer either designs her product so that it
does not require a contingent consumable or she designs it to be compati-
ble with an existing consumable that is provided by a competitive market.
However, all of the potential benefits from doing this arise as a result of
the way it eliminates the hold-up issue in the second period. At best, any
competition in the first period does no harm to the manufacturer. Thus, by
allowing for imperfect competition in period 2 only, we look at competition
in the most favorable light. However, as observed at Iomega and at Ama-
zon, it is not uncommon for a durable goods manufacturer to use a lock-in
strategy early in a product’s life-cycle while sending signals that it will per-
mit competition in the consumables market later on. We also note that this
assumption that competition occurs only in the second period is similar to
the assumptions of Choi and Stefanadis (2001) and Carlton and Waldman
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(2002).
The sequence of events in our extended model is as follows: In pe-
riod 1, the manufacturer chooses Q1 and y1, the quantities of durables and
consumables to produce without competition. The market clearing price for
the durable depends upon consumers’ anticipation of future durable sales
and availability of complements. In period 2, the manufacturer faces com-
petition in the consumables market from n rivals, whose products are per-
fect substitutes for the manufacturer’s consumable. The manufacturer acts
as a Stackelberg leader by choosing the cumulative quantity of the durable
Q2 and a quantity of consumables y20 to be made available in the market.
In response to the manufacturer’s actions each of the n rival suppliers of
consumables simultaneously choose the output quantities y2i(y20) for i =
1, 2, .., n . As in our original model, Q2 represents the total quantity of
durables that are available in period 2, including those units sold in period
1. Hence, by definition, Q2 ≥ Q1.
It is worth noting that, because our model of imperfect competition
involves competition in only period 2, the limiting case (n → ∞) will not
converge to our model of unrestricted access that was presented in Section
4.2.1 where consumers have access to the complement at marginal cost in
both periods. This distinction is intentional because our objective in this
section is to identify the most advantageous form of competition from the
perspective of the manufacturer. As discussed above, it is only the (de-
layed) competition in the second period that has the potential to benefit the
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manufacturer.
The prices of the consumables and durables are determined by their
inverse demand functions given in (4.4), where the total consumables out-
put is y2 = y20 + y21 + .. + y2n. In period 2, each of the n rivals choose y2i in
response to the manufacturers actions to maximize:
Πi (Q2 (Q1) , Y, y20) = y2i pc (Q2, y20 + yN) (4.12)
where yN = y21 + .. + y2n and Y is the n-dimensional vector of y2i, where
i = 1, 2, .., n. The manufacturer chooses Q2 and y20 to maximize:
πn2 (Q2 (Q1) , y20, Y



















where Y∗ (Q2, y20) is the n-dimensional vector of the optimal response of
the rivals y∗2i (Q2, y20) , resulting from the simultaneous maximization of
(4.12) for i = 1, 2, .., n rivals. The equilibrium to this second period game is
conditional upon Q1 and can be characterized as follows:
Lemma 4.2.5. a) If Q1 = 1, then Q∗2 (Q1) = 1 , and there exists two thresholds,





θ) , such that the quantity (y
∗
2) of consumables
that is produced is adequate to induce both types of consumers to purchase it if
and only if α ≥ α1(θ, n) . Otherwise, the market clearing price for consumables
exceeds the low-type consumers’ maximum marginal utility, i.e. pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2) ≥ α,
and low-type consumers do not consume any units of the consumable.
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b) If Q1 = θ then there exists a threshold,αθ(θ, n) =
√
θ(2n+1)
2(n+1)(1+2n+θ) , such that
Q∗2 (Q1) = 1 if α ≥ αθ(θ, n), while Q∗2 (Q1) = θ otherwise. In either case, the
quantity (y∗2) of consumables that is produced is adequate to ensure that each
consumer who owns a durable consumes a positive quantity of the consumable.




In Tables 4.4 and 4.5, we summarize the second period equilibrium that is
conditional upon Q1. Note that all of the values in these tables converge to
the corresponding values in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 when n = 0, reflecting the
fact that lock-in is a special case of imperfect competition.
For high values of α, the structure of this second period sub-game is
quite similar to the corresponding sub-game for lock-in. For both settings,
when α is sufficiently large, in this case α ≥ αθ(θ, n), the manufacturer sells
durables to all consumers who do not own it already and enough consum-
ables are produced so that pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2) < α and low-type consumers pur-
chase positive amounts of consumable. The threshold αθ(θ, n) is decreasing
in n, which implies that, as the number of competitors increases, the man-
ufacturer becomes increasingly willing to sell durables to consumers with
low marginal valuations if she has not done so already. Because it is this in-
creased willingness to sell to consumers with low valuations that gives rise
to time inconsistency, we can see how increased amounts of competition in
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the consumables market can aggravate consumers’ concerns about the price
of the durable decreasing over time.
Similarly, for low values of α the structure of this second period sub-
game is quite similar to the corresponding sub-game for lock-in. When α
is very low, the manufacturer does not sell durables to low-type consumers
who do not already own them, and the equilibrium price of consumables
would preclude their consumption by a low-type consumer even if he or
she had access to a durable.
Table 4.4: Second period quantities Q1 = θ
Q1 = θ α ≤ αθ(θ, n) α ≥ αθ(θ, n)
y∗20(Q1)
θ














Q∗2 (Q1) θ 1

























It is also of interest to observe from Tables 4.4 and 4.5 how the sec-
ond period consumables price is affected by the number, n, of rivals in the
consumables market. First, we can see that, for sufficiently large values of
α, the second period consumables price is lower when Q1 = θ than when
Q1 = 1. This can be confirmed by observing that θ1+2n+θ <
α+θ−αθ
2(n+1) so
long as α > θ1+2n+θ . The reason for this difference in consumables price
is the same as it was under lock-in; when the manufacturer sells durables
to low valuation consumers in the second period, she can extract their sur-
plus through the price of the durable and she can increase the size of this
extractable surplus by increasing output (driving down prices) of consum-
ables. We can also see from the tables, that the second period consumables
price is decreasing in n with the following exception: As shown in Table
4.5, when Q1 = 1 and α ∈ (αr(θ, n), α1(θ, n)) , the price of consumables is
independent of n. The reason for this is that, in this interval, the manufac-
turer reduces her own output to the maximum amount that eliminates the
incentive for any one of the rivals to unilaterally increase its own output
by enough to drive the consumables price below α. Although the amount
by which the manufacturer must reduce her own output certainly does de-
pend upon the number of rivals, the aggregate quantity, and consequently
the price, of consumables is (interestingly) independent of n. However, as
we will soon see, this situation does not arise in the equilibrium.
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Table 4.5: Second period quantities Q1 = 1
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Let us now turn our attention to the manufacturer’s first period prob-
lem under imperfect competition. In the first period, the manufacturer
seeks to maximize her profit which can be expressed as:
πn1 (Q1, y1) = Q1 p
C
d1 (Q1, y1) + y1 pc (Q1, y1) (4.14)
+ρπn2 (Q
∗
2 (Q1) , y
∗
20 (Q1) , Y




where the price of durable in period 1 is:
pCd1 (Q1, y1) = r (Q1, y1) + ρr (Q
∗
2 (Q1) , y
∗
20 (Q1) , Y




As under lock-in, the price of the durable depends on the quantities of
durables and consumables that are made available in period 1, and the con-
sumers anticipation of the manufacturer’s and the rivals’ optimal decisions
in period 2. By substituting (4.4), (4.5), and the results from Table 4.4 into
(4.15), we have that, when Q1 = θ, the first period durable price can be
expressed as:
pCd1 (θ, y1) =
Vh (pc (θ, y1)) + ρ
(2n+1)2
8(n+1)2 for α ≤ αθ(θ, n)




where the implicit rental price in period 1 is equal to Vh (pc (θ, y1)), the net
utility that a high-type consumer obtains when y1 consumables are made
available in period 1 for high-type consumers only. The implicit rental price
for period 2 depends upon the value of α; for α ≤ αθ(θ, n), no additional
durables are sold in the second period and therefore Vh(pc) represents the
implicit rental price. As shown in Table 4.4, when the manufacturer does
not sell additional durables, the total output of consumables is such that the
market price of consumables is pc = 12(n+1) . For α ≥ αθ(θ, n), consumers an-
ticipate that the durables will be sold to low-type consumers in the second
period, and therefore Vl(pc) represents the implicit rental price in period 2.
89
If Q1 = 1, the implicit rental price for the second period always re-
flects the net utility that will be received by a low-type consumer. Substitut-
ing (4.4), (4.5), and the results from Table 4.5 into (4.15), we have that, when
Q1 = 1, the first period durables price can be expressed as:
pCd1 (1, y1) =
{
Vl (pc (1, y1)) for α ≤ α1(θ, n)




where the implicit rental price in period 1 is equal to Vl (pc (1, y1)), the net
utility that a low-type consumer obtains when y1 consumables are made
available in period 1 and both types have access to durables. Recall that
for the case of Q1 = 1, we will have pc (1, y1) < α if and only if y1 >
(1− α)θ and for any y1 ≤ (1− α)θ, we will have Vl (pc (1, y1)) = 0. From
Lemma 4.2.5, that when α ≤ α1(θ, n) the second period output of consum-
ables is sufficiently low so that the market clearing price exceeds the max-
imum marginal utility of the low-type consumers, resulting in a net utility
of Vl (pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2)) = 0. Otherwise, when α > α1(θ, n), the second period
consumables output is sufficiently high so that low-type consumers obtain





We can now characterize the optimal solution to the game in which
the manufacturer is by herself in period 1 but is a Stackelberg leader in
period 2.
Proposition 4.2.6. (a) There exists two thresholds, αC(n, θ) and αC(n, θ), such
that αC(n, θ) ≥ αC(n, θ) = αθ(θ, n) where:
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• If α ≤ αC(n, θ), the manufacturer sells the durable to high-type consumers
in period 1 and does not sell to low-type consumers at all , i.e. Q∗1(α, θ) =
Q∗2(α, θ) = θ.
• If α ∈
(
αC(n, θ), αC(n, θ)
)
, the manufacturer sells to high-type consumers
in period 1 and low-type in period 2, i.e. Q∗1(α, θ) = θ < Q
∗
2(α, θ) = 1.
• If α ≥ αC(n, θ), the monopolist sells to all consumers in period 1, i.e. Q∗1(α, θ) =
Q∗2(α, θ) = 1.
b) In both periods, the consumable is available in sufficient quantity that the market
clearing price falls below the maximum marginal utility of all consumers who hold
the durable.
Table 4.6: Equilibrium Prices under Stackelberg Competition
Low α Medium α High α





































The equilibrium prices of the durable and the consumable under imperfect
competition are given in Table 4.6. The basic structure is similar to that of
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lock-in. Let us now consider the conditions under which imperfect compe-
tition dominates a lock-in strategy.
Proposition 4.2.7. For every θ ∈ (0, 1) and n ≥ 1, there exists thresholds, 0 <
α(n, θ) < α(n, θ) < 1 , such that the manufacturer benefits from competition in
the consumables market for all α < α(n, θ) and α > α(n, θ) .
The above result is illustrated in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. Recall from
Section 4.2.2 that unrestricted access dominates lock-in only when α suffi-
ciently high. This is because, while unrestricted access completely mitigates
the hold-up problem, it exacerbates time inconsistency to the extent that the
manufacturer always sells to low-type consumers in period 2, regardless of
how low their marginal utility (α) is. However, as we can see in the figures,
imperfect competition can dominate lock-in either when α is very high or
when it is very low. While imperfect competition does not completely elim-
inate the hold-up issue, neither does it necessarily induce the manufacturer
to sell to low-type consumers when their marginal utility is very low. Con-
sequently, when α is sufficiently low that the imperfect competition would
not induce durable sales to low-type consumers, the manufacturer can still
benefit from the role that is played by the competition in mitigating hold-
up.
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Figure 4.4: Profits of Manufac-
turer under Competition
Figure 4.5: Benefit for the Manu-
facturer as a Function of Compe-
tition (n) and Differentiation (α)
In Figure 4.4, we can also see that, the benefits of competition are not
necessarily monotone in the intensity of competition as measured by the
number, n, of rivals. For example, for α in the interval (α(20, θ), α(1, θ)), we
can see that although a single rival (n = 1) would be beneficial, many rivals
(n = 20) would be disastrous. The reason for this is that a single rival would
help to mitigate the hold-up problem without eroding the manufacturer’s
consumables revenue by so much that she will sell to low-type consumers in
period 2. However, for n = 20, the cannibalization of consumables revenue
would induce sales of durables to low-type consumers in period 2, and the
combined loss of consumables revenue as well as the implications for time
inconsistency would dominate any benefits from mitigating hold-up.
It is of some interest to compare how the three different strategic
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approaches that we have considered, i.e. unrestricted access, lock-in, and
imperfect competition, compare in terms of the total quantity of durable
products that are produced by the manufacturer. Because the issue of time
inconsistency is based on the idea that a durable goods manufacturer’s own
incentives over time cause her to produce more durables than she would if
she could pre-commit to her output quantity, the total quantity produced
is a reasonable proxy for the strength of the time inconsistency effects. The
larger the quantity, the stronger the time inconsistency effects.
Proposition 4.2.8. The total quantity of durables sold is lowest under lock-in, next
lowest under imperfect second period competition, and highest under unrestricted
access: i.e. QLI2 ≤ QC2 ≤ QU2 .
This result confirms that, as the manufacturer faces more competition
in the consumables market, she has stronger incentive to sell to low-type
consumers. When the manufacturer controls consumption through lock-in,
it is beneficial to sell durables to low-type consumers only if their net utility
is sufficiently high. However, the manufacturer can increase the net util-
ity of low-type consumers only by driving down the price of consumables
through increased output, and this interferes with the maximization of the
revenue that she can earn from selling consumables to high-type consumers
who are already locked-in. Consequently, a lock-in strategy decreases the
manufacturer’s temptation to reduce the price of her durable over time. Be-
cause competition in the consumables market erodes the potential profit
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that the manufacturer can make from selling consumables to locked-in con-
sumers, it increases her temptation to sell additional durables. However,
even with imperfect competition in the consumables market, the manufac-
turer has less incentive to sell durables to consumers with lower marginal
utilities than under unrestricted use. Recall that, as we have modeled im-
perfect competition, not only does it involve a lower intensity of compe-
tition, it also protects the manufacturer from competition in period 1, and
both of these differences will tend to reduce the manufacturer’s incentive to
sell durables to consumers with low marginal utilities.
4.3. Managerial Implications and Concluding Remarks
We demonstrate that a manufacturer’s lock-in strategy has two op-
posing effects upon strategic consumers. The first effect is the hold-up issue
that results from consumers’ anticipation that, once they have purchased a
durable, the manufacturer’s incentive to maximize profits from selling con-
sumables will interfere with their efficient utilization of the durable. This
effect tends to reduce consumers’ willingness to pay for the durable. How-
ever, the second effect is that the manufacturer’s revenue stream from con-
sumable sales to existing consumers may dampen her incentive to reduce
durables prices over time. Thus, while a lock-in strategy creates a hold-up
problem with respect to consumers, it can also partially mitigate time in-
consistency, and these two effects impose opposing forces upon consumers’
willingness to pay for the durable.
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In the absence of lock-in, where either no consumable is required
or where consumables are supplied by a competitive industry, consumers
anticipate unrestricted use of the durable, but they worry about time incon-
sistency, i.e. the manufacturer’s incentive to reduce the price of its durable
over time. With lock-in, once the manufacturer has sold durables to con-
sumers with high marginal utilities, she has two potential sources of rev-
enue in the second period: sales of consumables to the locked-in consumers,
and sales of both consumables and durables to the consumers with lower
marginal utilities, and this creates a trade-off. If the manufacturer were con-
cerned only with the revenue generated from selling consumables to high
marginal utility consumers, she would restrict availability to keep the mar-
ket clearing price high. Alternatively, if she sells durables to consumers
with lower marginal utilities, she will have two reasons to reduce the price
of consumables: First, the greater price sensitivity of the new consumers
will alone provide an incentive for her to reduce prices. Second, because the
manufacturer can extract the net utility of these new consumers through the
price of her durable, lower consumables prices increase the size of the net
utility that can be extracted. Of course, lower consumables prices also re-
duce the revenue that she earns from selling consumables to the consumers
who are already locked-in, and this serves as a deterrent to selling durables
to consumers whose marginal utilities are too low.
Our results indicate that, in order for a manufacturer to benefit from
a lock-in strategy, consumers need to be sufficiently differentiated in terms
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of their marginal utilities. When consumers are relatively homogeneous,
then time inconsistency is only a minor concern. Thus, a lock-in policy
would introduce the pernicious effects of hold-up without significant off-
setting benefits. Indeed, in the extreme where every consumer has the same
marginal utility for the use of the durable, the manufacturer should make
every effort to provide them with unrestricted access, either by designing
her product to not require a consumable or by designing it to be compatible
with a standardized consumable that may already exist in the market.
On the other hand, in situations where consumers are more differ-
entiated in terms of their marginal utilities, the manufacturer has more to
gain from having some way to restrict access to consumables. Specifically,
by using either a pure lock-in strategy or by allowing limited competition,
the manufacturer can use the complement to mitigate time inconsistency.
Our results also provide some guidelines for how a manufacturer should
interact with potential competitors in the market for consumables. First,
competition is beneficial only because of the role that it can play in pro-
viding assurance to consumers about future availability of consumables.
Therefore, it is vital that consumers believe that competition will exist in the
future. Of course, one way for a manufacturer to provide credible assur-
ance of such competition is to make her product compatible with consum-
ables that are already an industry standard. In our analysis, we referred to
this as the unrestricted access approach. While this approach eliminates the
hold-up problem, it leaves the manufacturer completely exposed to time
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inconsistency and vulnerable to the adverse effects of competition at the
beginning of the product life cycle. Nevertheless, this can be an appropri-
ate strategy when consumers are very homogeneous. Second, the effect of
competition upon the manufacturer’s profit is not necessarily monotone in
the intensity of competition. While increased competition reduces hold-up,
it also cannibalizes the manufacturer’s sales of consumables and increases
the effects of time inconsistency by increasing the manufacturer’s incentive
to sell durables to consumers with lower marginal utilities. Thus, when
consumers are moderately or highly differentiated, it may be most advan-
tageous to encourage a few selected rivals to supply consumables to the
market after the initial stage of the product life cycle. For example, Ama-
zon’s recent announcements about the possibility of providing alternative
sources of e-books for its Kindle reading device seem to be aimed at reas-
suring consumers of the future availability of consumables from alternative
suppliers. Similarly, although the manufacturers of smart-phones, such as
Apple’s iPhone, do not produce the consumables (minutes on telecommu-
nications networks) for their products themselves, their strategies of requir-
ing consumers to use one or two selected telecommunications carriers may
help them to balance the trade-off between hold-up and time inconsistency.
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Chapter 5
Durable Products and Contingent Consumables:
The effect of Consumable Stock-piling on the
Interaction between Time Inconsistency and
Lock-in.
5.1. Introduction
Most durable equipment need contingent consumables in order for
consumers to obtain continual use of the product, and it is fairly common
for durable product manufacturers to lock-in consumers by controlling the
supply of these consumables. For example, manufacturers of expensive ma-
chines such as aircrafts, construction equipment, etc., often are the sole sup-
pliers of product-specific replacement parts; Abbot Labs, which manufac-
tures FreeStyle glucose monitors, is an exclusive supplier of the disposable
strips needed for the glucose tests. Inkjet manufacturers such as HP rec-
ommend the use of proprietary cartridges for their inkjets and it is widely
believed that the revenues from toner cartridges form a significant portion
of the profits for an inkjet manufacturer.
The strategy of locking into its consumable empowers the durable
goods manufacturer in the consumables market; one way that a durable
product manufacturer can profit from locked-in consumers is by raising the
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prices of consumables. AT&T’s refusal to supply replacement switches to
one of its customers (Bell Atlantic) at reasonable prices is often cited as an
example of an abuse of power resulting from lock-in. When consumers
are strategic, the difference in prices of consumables over time that arises
from the manufacturer’s propensity to exploit locked-in consumers creates
an incentive for consumers to stock-pile consumables for future use.
In this chapter we investigate how consumers’ incentive to counter
lock-in by stockpiling consumables, interacts with the manufacturer’s pol-
icy for the sale of durables and consumables. The durable product manu-
facturer, as such faces, the notorious problem of time inconsistency, which
is her disincentive to commit to future prices that will allow her to pre-
serve the market value of the durable. In addition, the stockpile of con-
sumables interferes with the manufacturer’s ability to profit from locked-in
consumers, which in turn, influences the manufacturer’s strategy for selling
the durables.
Thus, a durable product manufacturer’s lock-in policy will induce
consumers to stock-pile consumables for strategic reasons thereby affecting
the manufacturer’s incentives for future production of the durables. Our
analysis shows that the effect of consumable stock-piling upon the incen-
tives of the durable good manufacturer depend on the extent of differenti-
ation among consumers when consumer inventory is transferable. In addi-
tion, we find that the effect of consumer stockpiling can be likened to the
presence of competition in the consumables market.
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5.2. Model
We adopt and enhance the consumer model developed in Chapter 4
to account for consumer stock-piling. Specifically, as in Chapter 4 we as-
sume that consumers derive utility from the durable only by using it in
conjunction with a contingent consumable. As in Chapter 4, let z be the
amount of use that a consumer derives from the durable in a given period.
Recall that consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation for the use of the
durable; the high (h) and the low (l) types, whose marginal utilities from
consuming z units of the consumable are U
′
h(z) = 1− z and U
′
l(z) = α− z
respectively, where α < 1. By construction, we can see that the utilities for




0 (α− z)dz = αz−
z2
2
if i = l∫ z
0 (1− z)dz = z−
z2
2
if i = h
We normalize the market size to 1 and denote by θ the fraction of
consumers who are type h consumers. In any period in which a consumer
has access to the durable, he maximizes his utility by consuming it until the
point that his marginal utility is equal to the price at which the contingent
consumable can be obtained. Recall that if the consumable is available at





[1− pc]+ if i = h
[α− pc]+ if i = l
(5.1)
and the net utility associated with his use can be represented as follows
Vi(pc) = Ui(zi(pc))− zi(pc)pc (5.2)
Consistent with the assumptions in Chapter 4, we assume that the
manufacturer sells, rather than leases, the durable product. Further, we al-
low for the possibility that consumers will purchase consumables that they
can either consume now or stock-pile for future use. The sequence of events
is as follows: In period 1, the manufacturer chooses Q1 and y1 , the quan-
tities of durables and consumables respectively. The prices at which the
market clears depend on the response of rational consumers, who purchase
consumables for consumption in the current period, and stock-pile consum-
ables for future use in anticipation of the second period equilibrium. In pe-
riod 2, the manufacturer responds to consumers’ stock-pile of consumables
by choosing a cumulative quantity of the durables, Q2 and the quantity of
consumables y2 . To keep the exposition simple, we assume that marginal
costs of production of the consumable and the durable are zero. Allowing
for positive marginal costs of the consumable, does not alter the insights
obtained from our model. However, sufficiently high marginal costs of pro-
duction for the durable eliminates time inconsistency, as the manufacturer’s
incentive to produce additional durables decreases. For our results to be
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applicable, it is sufficient to assume that the marginal cost of production of
durable is low enough so that the low type consumers obtain some surplus
from consumption.
In order to avoid notational density, we also make the following as-
sumptions ; i) the manufacturer and consumers do not discount future utili-
ties and profits and ii) the holding cost incurred by consumers for the stock-
piled consumables is zero. Although, it is desirable to relax the model to
allow for discounting and non-zero costs of holding inventory, this relax-
ation clutters the model, hindering the interpretation of the results. For the
holding costs, the consumers’ incentive to stock-pile decreases as the cost
increases so that in the extreme case of very high holding costs, consumers
do not stock-pile consumables and our model reduces to that of lock-in ana-
lyzed in Chapter 4; we will use this extreme case as a benchmark to compare
our results.
In order to characterize the relationship among the prices and de-
mands in a given period t, we begin by deriving the inverse demand for
consumables as a function of the quantity of durables (Qt) in use. Let pct
represent the price of consumables in period t . The supply of consum-
ables in period t is yt + xt−1 , where yt is quantity of consumables supplied
by the manufacturer in period t and xt−1 is the stock-pile of consumables
from period t− 1. Consumers will purchase consumables in a given period
only if they have access to a durable, and the price is below their maximum
marginal utility, i.e. α for type l and 1 for type h . In addition, the cumulative
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quantity of durables Qt ∈ [0, 1], but it is sufficient to restrict our attention to
quantities 0, θ or 1. The demand for consumables in a given period has two
components, i) the consumption in the current period Dt(Qt, pct) , where
Dt is given below and ii) the quantity stockpiled by consumers xt , in antic-
ipation of the manufacturer’s response in the subsequent period t + 1.
Dt(Qt, pct) =

0 if Qt = 0
zh(pct) if Qt = θ or pct ≤ α
θzh(pct) + (1− θ)zl(pct) otherwise
(5.3)
Therefore, in a given period t, the market clearing price for consumables is
the solution of the following equation:
yt(Qt, pct) + xt−1 = Dt(Qt, pct) + xt(Qt+1(Qt, pct), pct+1(Qt, pct)) (5.4)
Recall that the implicit rental price is the price at which the durable
could be rented in a given period. In each period, the implicit rental price, r
is a function of the quantity (Q) of durables available and the consumables





2 if Qt = θ
Vl(pct) =
(α−pct)2
2 if Qt = 1
(5.5)
In period 2, the price of the durable is simply the implicit rental price. The
most that the manufacturer can charge for the durable in period 1 is the im-
104
plicit rental price in period 1 as given by (5.5 ), plus the discounted antici-
pated second period durable price. We established the manufacturer’s strat-
egy under the benchmark case of lock-in in Chapter 4, where consumers do
not hold stock-pile consumables; we now analyze our model when con-
sumers strategically stock-pile consumables for future use. In analyzing
this model we assume that inventories carried over are perfect substitutes
for current production. In addition, we assume that consumer inventories
are perfectly transferable; transfer is possible, for example, when the market
for consumables is highly efficient.
An equivalent way to model transferable consumer inventory is to
assume that there are sufficiently large number of competitive firms (hoard-
ers) that hold inventory of consumables. When the manufacturer makes
consumables available in period 1, the hoarders buy up consumables and
hold them in inventory for sale in period 2. Consistent with the assumptions
stated earlier, all the hoarders have zero holding cost and have no ability to
produce additional consumables. We solve the game between the manufac-
turer, consumers and the hoarders using standard backward induction.
The market clearing price for the consumables in period 2 depends
upon Q2, y2 and x1, according to the equation 5.4. Solving 5.4 for x2 = 0 ,
we can obtain pc2(Q2, y2, x1) as defined follows:
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pc2(Q2, y2, x1) =

0 if Q2 = 0
1− y2+x1θ if Q2 = θ or y2 + x1 ≤ (1− α)θ
θ + α(1− θ)− (y2 + x1) otherwise
(5.6)
Then, the price of the durable in period 2, pd2, is given by the implicit rental
price r(Q2, pc(Q2, y2)) as defined in equation 5.5. In the presence of stock-
piling, the manufacturer solves the following problem in period 2:
max
y2,Q2
πS2 (Q1, Q2, y2, x1) = (Q2−Q1) r(Q2, pc(Q2, y2, x1))+ y2 pc(Q2, y2, x1)
(5.7)
Lemma 5.2.1. a) If Q1 = 1, then Q∗2 (Q1) = 1, and the quantity (y
∗
2 + x1) of
consumables available in period 2 is adequate to induce both types of consumers to
purchase if and only if if x1 ≥ x(Q1 = 1) = θ(1− α)− α
√
θ . Otherwise, the
market clearing price for consumables exceeds the low-type consumers’ maximum
marginal utility, i.e. pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2) ≥ α, and low-type consumers do not consume
any units of the consumable.
b) If Q1 = θ then Q∗2 (Q1) = 1 if and only if
x1 ≥ x(Q1 = θ) = θ − α
√
2θ(1 + θ), while Q∗2 (Q1) = θ otherwise. In either
case, the availability of consumables is sufficiently high so that each consumer who
owns a durable consumes a positive quantity of the consumable.
c) The threshold inventory x(Q1), above which the manufacturer serves both con-
sumers in period 2 is non-decreasing in Q1
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Table 5.1: Optimal second period quantities Q1 = 1
Q1 = 1 x1 ≤ −α
√
θ + θ(1− α) x1 ≥ −α
√
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4(α + θ − αθ − x1)2
The optimal quantities, prices of consumable and durables, and the optimal profits
of the manufacturer as a function of x are summarized in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
Based on Lemma 5.2.1 it is easy to see that, when the quantity of
stock-piled inventory is very high maximum, i.e. x1 ≥ θ(1− α)− α
√
θ, then
in the second period the manufacturer sells durables to all consumers who
do not own it already and the market clearing price of consumables falls low
enough to attract purchases from the low-type consumer, i.e. pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2 , x1) <
α. When the stock-pile of consumables is in the intermediate range, that
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Table 5.2: Optimal second period quantities Q1 = θ
Q1 = θ x1 ≤ θ − α
√




































is θ − α
√
2θ(1 + θ) ≤ x1 and x1 ≤ θ(1 − α) − α
√
θ, the quantity of con-
sumables in inventory is high enough to induce the manufacturer to sell
durables to the low-type consumers if they have not purchased the durable
in period 1. However, the inventory of consumables is not large enough
to induce consumable sales to low-type consumers if they already own the
durable. In this intermediate range of x1, in order to sell to low end con-
sumers who already own the durable, the firm will have to produce large
enough quantity of consumables so as to induce a low enough price on con-
sumables for the low type consumers to purchase. When the stock-pile of
consumables is very low, i.e. x1 ≤ θ − α
√
2θ(1 + θ), the manufacturer does
not sell durables to the low end consumers if they do not own them already.
From 5.2.1 we can infer that the inventory held by hoarders should be suffi-
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ciently high to induce the manufacturer to serve the low type consumers in
period 2.
In the presence of stock-piled consumables in period 2, the additional
output produced by the manufacturer’s is driven by whether or not the
manufacturer can sell additional durables. When Q1 = 1, the optimal deci-
sion of the manufacturer in period 2 is driven by maximization of consum-
able profits alone. However, when Q1 = θ, the manufacturer maximizes
joint profits from the sale of consumables as well as durables; the additional
durables sold to low type consumers in period 2 will allow the manufac-
turer to extract all the surplus that is created for the low type consumers
through rents on the durable. The opportunity to sell additional durables
in period 2 increases the manufacturer’s incentive to increase availability of
consumables thereby lowering the price of the consumables. Therefore, as
part c) of Lemma 5.2.1 indicates, for a lower Q1, lower levels of inventory is
sufficient to trigger sales to the low type consumers in period 2.
So far, we derived the optimal response of the manufacturer in pe-
riod 2, given the quantity of consumables held by the hoarders, x1 . We now
derive the equilibrium stock-piling behavior, as a function of the quantity
of durables sold in period 1, Q1 and the quantity of consumables, y1 made
available by the manufacturer in period 1. In deriving the demand function
x1(Q1, y1), we take into account the fact that consumers fully anticipate the
response of the manufacturer in period 2 to the inventory they stock-pile in
period 1. At a given quantity of durables, Q1 and consumables y1, made
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available by the manufacturer in period 1, the discount factor ρ and the per
unit holding cost h , the equilibrium demand for stock-piling, x1 , to be used
in period 2 can be determined from the following equation:
pc1(Q1, y1, x1) + h = ρpc2(Q∗2(Q1, y1, x1), y
∗
2(Q1, x1), x1) (5.8)
The equation 5.8 states that hoarders hold a quantity x1 in inventory
such that the price they pay in the current period to purchase them plus the
holding cost(h) is equal to the discounted price in period 2, where the dis-
count factor is ρ. To see why the equation 5.8 holds, suppose pc1(Q1, y1, x1)+
h < ρpc2(Q∗2(Q1, y1, x1), y
∗
2(Q1, x1), x1) , that is price of consumables in pe-
riod 1 is less than in period 2. Then the hoarders can make a positive margin
from holding an additional unit, therefore the hoarders have an incentive to
increase their stock-piled quantity x1. Now suppose pc1(Q1, y1, x1) + h ≥
ρpc2(Q∗2(Q1, y1, x1), y
∗
2(Q1, y1, x1), x1), i.e. the price of consumables in pe-
riod 1 plus the holding cost is greater than the anticipated price of consum-
ables in period 2, then the hoarders do not have an incentive to stock-pile
consumables. Therefore, we can see that in equilibrium, the equation 5.8
holds. Although we use a general holding cost h , and discount factor ρ to
illustrate how they influence the stock-piling behavior above, for tractabil-
ity we will set h = 0 and ρ = 1 for the rest of the analysis.
Solving the (5.8) we obtain the price of consumables in period 1 as follows:
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pc1(Q1, y1, x1) =

0 if Q1 = 0
1− y1−x1θ if Q1 = θ or y1 − x1 ≤ (1− α)θ
θ + α(1− θ)− (y1 − x1) otherwise
(5.9)
The equilibrium stock-pile of consumables conditional on the manufacturer’s
actions in period 1 is characterized in the following Lemma:




2(Q1, y1), α, θ),
(we use x∗1(Q1, y1, α, θ) for brevity) can be characterized as follows:
x∗1(Q1, y1, α, θ) =

max{0, 13(2y1 − (α(1− θ) + θ)}










and Q1 = 1
max{0, 13(2y1 − θ)}




− 2θ and Q1 = θ




Figure 5.1: An illustration of equilibrium stock-piling
The equilibrium quantity of consumables held in inventory depends
on consumers expectation of future durable sales; Specifically, the quantity
of consumables stock-piled is inversely related to the expected quantity of
durables that will be sold in period 2. For a given quantity of consumables,
y1 made available in period 1, the consumers ration a lower proportion of
consumables for future consumption when they expect that a higher quan-
tity of durables will be sold in period 2; this explains the drop in the equi-
librium holding quantity x∗1 , at y1 = y1, in Figure 5.1. Further, higher the
Q1, higher is the threshold quantity of consumables y1 , that induces the
manufacturer to serve to both consumer groups in period 2.
Having established the second period equilibrium we solve the first
period problem in which the manufacturer maximizes the following profits:
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where the price of durable ( pSd1) in period 1 is given by
pSd1(Q1, y1) = r(Q1, y1, x
∗








Clearly the price of the durable depends not only on the quantities of durables
and consumables produced in period 1, but also upon the consumers’ an-
ticipation of the manufacturer’s optimal decisions in period 2. Further, note
that as a result of stock-piling and our assumption that consumers incur no
holding costs and the discount factor ρ = 1, from 5.8, we have that the price
of consumables in period 1 equals the price in period 2. From this logic,
(5.10), (5.5), and the results from Table 5.2 we can derive the price of the
durable in period 1. When Q1 = θ, the first period durable price can be
expressed as:














If Q1 = 1, and the manufacturer makes very few consumables avail-










), then she induces a price of con-
sumables greater than α. In such a situation the low type consumers would
choose not to purchase any consumables and the only way that the firm can
sell durables to all the consumers is by giving the durable away. However,
such a choice would not be optimal for the manufacturer as she will clearly
be better off if she sold the durable to high type consumers alone. There-
fore we can conclude that if the manufacturer chooses to sell the durable to
both types of consumers then she would simultaneously choose a quantity











logic, (5.10), (5.5), and the results from Table 5.2 we can derive the price of
the durable in period 1 when Q1 = 1.
pSd1 (1, y1) =
(y1 + α− 2(1− α)θ)2
9
(5.14)
We can now characterize the optimal solution to the manufacturer’s
problem when she locks-in consumers and consumers strategically stock-
pile consumables.
Proposition 5.2.3. (a) For every θ ∈ (0, 1), there exists αS(θ) and αS(θ), where
αS(θ) < αs(θ) < 1, such that:
• If α ≤ αS(θ), the manufacturer sells the durable to high-type consumers in
period 1 and does not sell to low-type consumers at all , i.e. Q∗1(α, θ) =
Q∗2(α, θ) = θ.
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• If αS(θ) ≤ α ≤ αS(θ) the manufacturer sells to high-type consumers in
period 1 and low-type in period 2, i.e. Q∗1(α, θ) = θ < Q
∗
2(α, θ) = 1.
• If α ≥ αS(θ), the monopolist sells to all consumers in period 1, i.e. Q∗1(α, θ) =
Q∗2(α, θ)) = 1.
Table 5.3: Equilibrium Prices under Lock-in with Stock-Piling
Low α Medium α High α





















The optimal policy for selling durables and consumables under lock-
in with stock-piling mirrors the structure of lock-in without stock-piling.
The equilibrium prices of the durable and consumable in period 1 are given
in Table 5.3. We numerically compare below the effect of consumer stock-
piling on the total quantity of durables sold and the profits of the manufac-
turer. Although, I have been unable to prove analytically, numerical results
indicate that ’lock-in with stock piling’ yields higher profits than ’lock-in
without stock-piling’ when consumers are either homogeneous or highly
heterogeneous. As can be seen in Figure 5.2 we can see that the manufac-
turer benefits from stock-piling for all α ≥ ←→α (θ) and α ≤ α←→(θ).
In the presence of lock-in, the manufacturer’s incentive to restrict fu-
ture availability of consumables creates a hold-up problem with respect to
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the price of the consumables. In order to counter this hold-up, consumers
have an incentive to stock-pile consumables for future use. To the extent
that this strategic stock-piling alleviates the hold-up problem for consumers
it also decreases the manufacturers ability to profit from selling consum-
ables to locked-in consumers, thereby increasing her incentive to sell addi-
tional durables.
Figure 5.2: Profits under Stock-Piling vs Lock-in
To the extent that stock-piling cannibalizes manufacturer’s sales of
consumables, it helps to mitigate the hold-up problem with respect to con-
sumers who purchase the durables in period 1 and, under certain condi-
tions, increases the profits of the manufacturer. For example, in Figure 5.2
, for α ≥ ←→α (θ) and α ≤ α←→(θ), ’lock-in with stock-piling’ results in prof-
its higher than the benchmark case of ’lock-in without stock-piling’. In a
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relatively homogeneous market time-inconsistency is less important as the
manufacturer sells durables to all her consumers in period 1; however, hold-
up is a concern. Similarly, in a highly differentiated market time inconsis-
tency is irrelevant as the manufacturer avoids selling to the low type con-
sumers. Therefore, when α is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low, the
ability to stock-pile mitigates the hold-up problem yielding higher profits
than the benchmark case (also reflected in Figure 5.2).
5.3. Managerial Implications and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we continue our investigation of the effectiveness of a
lock-in strategy for a durable product manufacturer in the presence of con-
sumer stock-piling. It is useful to recognize that stock-piling of consumables
introduces an inefficiency in the system because of the holding costs asso-
ciated with stock-piling. Thus, even though stock-piling makes little sense
from a consumer’s perspective our findings indicate that there are strategic
benefits associated with stock-piling for both the consumers as well as the
manufacturer. From both a consumer’s point of view as well as the manu-
facturer’s, stock-piling is an effective strategic tool to address the potential
hold-up problem that arises from the durable good manufacturer’s lock-in
strategy. When consumers are highly homogeneous, by softening the hold-
up problem, stock-piling increases extractable rents for the manufacturer.
Ofcourse, the best strategy that a firm could adopt would be for the
manufacturer to commit to future prices of the durables and consumables
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so as to maximize the rents that she can extract from consumers. However,
the lack of a credible commitment mechanism results in the durable firm to
behave in a time inconsistent manner. In Chapter 4, we recognized that by
locking-in consumers to its contingent product, the durable good firm can
soften the time inconsistency problem when consumers are either highly
homogeneous or highly heterogeneous. Recall however, that lock-in also
introduces a hold-up problem for consumers with respect to the usage of
the product.
In this chapter we explored how consumers’ propensity to stock-
pile consumables in order to address the hold-up problem associated with
lock-in, affects the strategy of the durable product manufacturer. Our re-
sults indicate that consumer stock-piling addresses the hold-up problem to
a certain extent and could be beneficial when consumers are sufficiently ho-
mogeneous. However, for moderately differentiated consumer population,
lock-in in the presence of consumer stock-piling may hurt the manufacturer
by worsening the time inconsistency problem. The rationale is that as the
stock-piled consumables erode the manufacturer’s ability to profit from sell-
ing consumables to locked-in consumers, it results in an increased incentive
to sell additional durables to the low type consumers. By allowing con-
sumers to stock-pile the manufacturer creates competition for herself in the
consumable market in period 2, and thus stock-piling can be likened to the
presence of competition in the consumables market.
As recognized in Chapter 4, extremely high levels of competition
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completely takes away the firms revenues from the consumables in pe-
riod 2, inducing the manufacturer to sell additional durables to continue
to make profits. However, locking-in consumers and at the same time al-
lowing consumers to stock-pile consumables may be better than allowing
infinite number of competitors in the consumables market. Because, under
lock-in, by definition, the manufacturer is the sole producer of consumables.
Although stock-piling of consumables creates competition, she still retains
market power in the consumable market because of the fact that she is the
sole supplier of consumables.
In conclusion, when a durable good manufacturer adopts a lock-in
strategy through a contingent consumable, allowing consumers to stock-
pile the consumables will help to mitigate consumer’s anxiety about being
held-up with respect to the price of consumables. However, it also erodes
the manufacturer’s revenue stream from consumables and increasing her
incentive to sell additional durables thus exacerbating time inconsistency.
We show that lock-in with consumer stock-piling is most beneficial when
consumers are homogeneous so that hold-up is a bigger concern than is
time inconsistency or when consumers are highly heterogeneous that the
lower segment is ignored. In essence, a durable good manufacturer when
adopting a lock-in strategy, can mitigate her own potential for opportunistic
behavior in the future by allowing consumers to stock-pile consumables.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks and Future Work
My dissertation focuses on two issues that affect the product strategy
of a firm; the first is consumer choice and its influence on optimal product
assortments and the second is the interaction between durable products and
their contingent consumables.
On-line search engines such as Kayak (a travel search firm) and Nex-
tag (a product search firm) cannot influence the pricing of their products,
but they can influence their profits by choosing the right set of products
to display. Motivated by the product choice of search firms, in Chapter 3
titled: ’Making the Most of Choice: Product Selection under Heterogeneous Con-
sumer Preferences,’ I study the assortment planning problem of a firm under
a general consumer choice model. I find that solving for the optimal assort-
ment for a firm when consumer’s choice has very little structure, is indeed
a complex task. However, it is one that deserves attention and has wide
practical implications for a number of retailers as well as e-tailers.
In Chapter 3, I illustrate the complexity of solving the product se-
lection problem in the most general case. By placing simple restrictions I
show that our model can be reduced to commonly used choice models such
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as Multinomial Logit, locational choice and other substitution models. I
present simple solutions for some commonly used choice models such as
locational choice and downward substitution models, and develops heuris-
tics for other practically motivated models that do not render themselves to
simple approaches.
This work has exciting applications for search firms to enhance their
market reach and for retailers to enhance their product selection processes.
My work is as also an excellent starting point for studying more complex
consumer choice processes. There are several important directions that can
be pursued in from here; one of them is to study the influence of fixed and
substitution costs. Another, is to understand the interaction between prod-
uct substitution and competition and how it influences the optimal assort-
ments. Finally, developing some bounds on the loss that a retailer incurs by
assuming simple consumer choice models may be a promising direction to
pursue.
While, the primary challenge for firms that deal with a large num-
ber of products is to decipher the complexity of consumer choice, a durable
goods monopolist is mainly concerned about the strategic implications of its
potential for opportunistic behavior in the future. Chapter 4 and 5 specifi-
cally study the incentives of a durable goods monopolist when it can lock-in
consumers through a contingent consumable.
It is possible for durable product firms to lock-in consumers by re-
quiring them to use a consumable that is proprietary to the firm. For exam-
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ple, Amazon, which is the manufacturer of the reading device Kindle, locks-
in consumers by supporting e-books on its machine only in a restricted
number of formats (primarily in the proprietary AZW format). Such a lock-
in has two interesting effects on the incentives of a durable goods manufac-
turer. On one hand, by locking-in consumers to its consumable, a durable
goods monopolist can curb its temptation to reduce durable prices over
time, thereby mitigating the classic time inconsistency problem. On the
other hand, lock-in will create a hold-up issue and adversely affect con-
sumers’ expectations of future prices for the consumable. In Chapter 4
titled: ’Durable Products, Time Inconsistency and Lock-in’, we demonstrate
the trade-off between time inconsistency and hold-up, and derive insights
about the conditions under which a lock-in strategy can be effective. In ad-
dition, I analyze competition in the consumables market and its effects on
the manufacturers incentives for lock-in.
I find that time inconsistency and hold-up problem associated with
lock-in interact in an interesting and non-evident fashion. At the same time
that lock-in creates a hold-up problem with respect to consumables it also
helps to address the time inconsistency problem. For a traditional durable
goods monopolist, in the absence of revenues from consumable sales, the
incentive to lower the price of the durable to attract more price sensitive
consumers prevails, hurting the profits of the manufacturer. However, with
lock-in, the revenues that the durable firm can make from selling consum-
ables to locked-in high valuation consumers prevents the firm from drop-
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ping the price of the durable too low to sell to the low end consumers. Thus
lock-in offers some protection from time inconsistency for the durable good
firm. It also can be viewed as a way for firms to place their high end inno-
vations in the hands of those consumers who value and pay for it the most,
without resulting in a quick death of the market for the durable.
In the example above of Amazon’s Kindle, consumers cannot hold
inventory of consumables such as e-books. However, for certain products
such as replacement parts, it is possible for consumers to buy-up consum-
ables for future use. In Chapter 5, we identify the consumers’ incentive
to stock-pile consumables in anticipation of a hold-up problem that arises
from the manufacturer’s lock-in strategy. Further, we investigate the impli-
cations of these consumable inventories, held for strategic reasons, on the
interaction between time-inconsistency and hold-up. Our findings indicate
that strategic inventories have an effect similar to that of competition, as
they help to dampen the hold-up problem that arises from lock-in. This re-
search on durability and lock-in has implications for durable product manu-
facturers in choosing an appropriate business model for their products and
is therefore of practical significance.
My work on durable products and contingent consumables, can be
extended to analyze the market for consoles and video games. More specif-
ically: incorporating network effects and entry control mechanisms in the
video game market to understand the incentives of durable product firms
and investigating strategic issues associated with assortment planning and
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product line design in the context of intermediaries and inventories are in-
teresting directions to pursue. It would also be of interest to understand
the effect of competition in durables as well as new product introductions
on the interaction between lock-in and time inconsistency. My studies so
far contribute to the rich literature on assortment planning, product line de-
sign and the marketing of durable products, and have excellent potential to






Making the most of choice: Product selection
under heterogeneous consumer preferences
Proof of Proposition 3.1.4: Given Lemmas 3.1.2 and 3.1.2, it is sufficient to
show that, for any set I, O and T,
f minj (I, O, T) ≤ minS:j/∈S
I⊆S⊆(N\O)
Cj(S), (A.1)





















































= f minj (I, O, T).
(A.2) can be shown in a similar fashion. 


























































Proof of Proposition 3.1.7: From Li (2007) we know that one of the
sets S(1), ...S(n) is optimal. We show that πj ≤ EΠ(S(j−1)) implies that
πj+1 ≤ EΠ(S(j)). We do this by contradiction: assume that πj ≤ EΠ(S(j−1))
and πj+1 > EΠ(S(j)). Because πj ≥ πj+1, we also have that πj > EΠ(S(j)),
and












1 + ∑j−1j=1 vj
πi = EΠ(S(j−1)),
which is a contradiction. Let j∗ be the largest integer such that πj∗ > EΠ(S(j∗−1)).
It follows that πj > EΠ(S(j−1)) for j = 1, ..., j∗ and πj ≤ EΠ(S(j−1)) for all
j = j∗ + 1, ..., n. By (3.6), this implies that Cj(S(j−1)) > 0 for j = 1, ..., j∗ and
Cj(S(j−1)) ≤ 0 for j = j∗ + 1, ..., n, which in turns implies that EΠ(S(1)) <
... < EΠ(S(j∗−1)) < EΠ(S(j∗)) ≥ EΠ(S(j∗+1)) ≥ ...EΠ(S(n)). Hence, S(j∗) is
optimal.
Now we show that πj∗+1 > πj∗ . Suppose (contradiction) that πj∗+1 =
πj∗ . From (A.3) we see that when πj+1 = πj, we have πj > EΠ(S(j−1)) if
and only if πj+1 > EΠ(S(j)). Hence, we would have πj∗+1 > EΠ(S(j∗)),
which is a contradiction to the definition of j∗. 
Proof of Lemma 3.1.8: Suppose (contradiction) that all the optimal assort-
ments are such that there exists i, j ∈ S with i < j and bi + Li ≥ bj + Lj. Let
S∗ be one of them. In this case every customer prefers product i to product
j so that Rj(S∗) = 0. By (P1), Ri(S∗\{j}) ≤ Ri(S∗) ≤ Ri(S∗\{j})− Rj(S∗)
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for all i 6= j and i ∈ S∗. Hence, Ri(S∗\{j}) = Ri(S∗) for all i 6= j and i ∈ S∗
and therefore EΠ(S∗) = EΠ(S∗\{j}) so that S∗\{j} is also optimal, which
is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1.9: a) Let S = {s1, . . . , sk} with s1 < ... < sk, such
that bsj + Lsj < bsj+1 + Lsj+1 for j = 1, ..., k− 1. Let p(S) be the path that
corresponds to assortment S, where p(S) = (0, 0)→ (s1, s2)→ (s2, s3)→
...→ (sk−1, sk)→ (sk, n + 1)→ (n + 1, n + 1). Let P be the set of all
admissible paths, i.e., the paths with finite costs. Every assortment that
satisfies the condition of Lemma 3.1.8 corresponds to a path in P and vice
versa.
The cost of path p(S) is equal to:





min{a(s1,s2), bs1 + Ls1}
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G (bsk + Lsk)− G
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b) The complexity of a shortest path problem in an acyclic network is
bounded by the number of arcs . The graph has a special structure, because
there is possibly an arc between two nodes (i, j) to (k, l) only if j = k. There
are at most j nodes that end with product j ∈ {1, 2, .., n} and these are
connected to at most n + 1− j nodes that start with product j. Therefore,
the maximum number of arcs is equal to 2n +
n
∑(n + 1− j)j
j=1
, where 2n is
the maximum number of nodes leaving the source or ending in the
destination node. Therefore the total number of arcs and hence the
complexity of the algorithm is O(n3).
Proof of Proposition 3.1.10: Suppose S∗ is an optimal assortment but
suppose there exists j ∈ G but j /∈ S∗. From (3.2),
Cj(S∗) = ∑
i∈S∗
(Ri(S∗)− Ri(S∗ ∪ {j})(πj − πi)
+
(
Rj(S∗ ∪ {j})− ∑
i∈S∗






(Ri(S∗)− Ri(S∗ ∪ {j})(πj − πi) (A.4)
+
Rj(S∗ ∪ {j})− ∑
i∈S∗
i>j
(Ri(S∗)− Ri(S∗ ∪ {j})
πj
Using (3.10). The first term in (A.4) is non negative by (P1) and the fact that
πj ≥ πi for i > j and the second term is non negative because of (P2). Hence
Cj(S∗) ≥ 0. We get the result by repeating the same procedure for each k in
G and not in S∗. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.1.11: a) First, note that adding product n cannot de-
crease expected profit: for all S such that n /∈ S, we have Cn(S) = Rn(S ∪
{n})πn ≥ 0 because Rj(S) = Rj(S ∪ {n}) for j < n. Second, consider an as-
sortment S = {s1, s2, .., sk, n}, such that s1 < s2 < . . . < sk < n. Let p(S) be
the path that corresponds to set S, i.e., p(S) = 0→ s1 → s2 → . . .→ sk → n.
It follows that every path with finite cost corresponds to an assortment that
contains product n and vice versa. Let P be the set of all admissible paths.
The cost of path p(S) is equal to




















b) The complexity of a shortest path problem in an acyclic network is bounded
by the number of arcs. There are (n+1)(n+2)2 arcs. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1.12: First note that n ∈ S∗. Let S∗ = {s1, ..., sk, n}
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with s1 < ... < sk < n. By definition of S∗, πs1 ≥ πs2 ≥ ... ≥ πsk ≥ πn. Also,
EΠ(S∗) = (α(1,...,n) + ... + α(s1,...,n))πs1 + (α(s1+1,...,n) + ... + α(s2,...,n))πs2













where UB1 is the upper bound defined in 3.1.2. Hence S∗ is optimal.
Proof of Lemma 3.1.13: First suppose that all the optimal assortments con-
tain more than one product. Let S be one of them. Let î be such that
î = min{j : j ∈ S}. Note that Rj(S) = 0 for all j ∈ S and j > î. By
(P1), Rî(S) = Rî(S\{j}) for all j ∈ S, j > î. Hence, we can remove all such
products without affecting expected profit and EΠ(S) = Rî({î})πî. Hence
it is optimal to offer only product k such that Rk({k})πk = maxj Rj({j})πj.

























Cj(S) = Cj (N\(O ∪ {j})) . (A.6)







(α(j,i) + α(i,j))πj + (α(j,k) + α(k,j))πj + α(j)πj,
Cj(S ∪ {k}) = ∑
i∈S
α(j,i)(πj − πi)
+α(j,k)(πj − πk) + ∑
i 6=j,k
i/∈S
(α(j,i) + α(i,j))πj + α(j)πj.
We have Cj(S) ≥ Cj(S ∪ {k}) because (α(j,k) + α(k,j))πj ≥ α(j,k)(πj − πk) for
all k 6= j and k /∈ S. Hence, the maximum is achieved with the smallest set
S that satisfies the conditions in (A.5), i.e. I, and the minimum is achieved




Durable Products, Time inconsistency, and
Lock-in
Proof of Lemma 4.2.2
a) When Q1 = 1, we must have Q2 = 1 also. Thus, (4.7) reduces to maximiz-
ing the following second period profit function with respect to the quantity
of consumables:






if y2 ≤ (1− α)θ
y2 (θ + α(1− θ)− yc2) if y2 ≥ (1− α)θ
where we have simply substituted (4.4) and (4.5) into (4.7). The above ex-
pression is continuous and piece-wise concave, and the first-order condi-






2 respectively. It is easy to show that y
c2
2 < (1− α)θ if and only if
α < θ1+θ , while y
c1
2 > (1− α)θ if and only if α > 12 . It follows from this and
the continuity of πLI2 (1, 1, y2) that α <
θ
1+θ implies that the optimal quantity
of consumables is y∗2 = y
c1
2 , while α >
1












, then both yc12 ≤ (1− α)θ and yc22 ≥ (1− α)θ,
so both of them are candidates to be the optimal quantity. By substituting
















≤ 12 . The result follows from the
fact that, in order for the market clearing price of the consumable to fall
below the low-type consumers’ maximum marginal utility, we must have
y2 ≥ (1− α)θ.
b) When Q1 = θ then the monopolist has two options with respect to the
sales of the durable in period 2: She can either set Q2 = 1 and sell additional
durables to the low-type consumers or she can set Q2 = θ, not selling any
more durables. If she sets Q2 = θ, then she produces the quantity of con-
sumables that maximizes her revenues from selling consumables to high-





tively, if she sets Q2 = 1 then the market clearing price from the additional
durable sales will be positive if and only if y2 ≥ (1− α)θ. Otherwise, the
price of consumables would be prohibitively high, i.e. pc (1, y2) > α, and
the low-type consumers would obtain no benefit from owning the durable.
Given the quantity of consumables that she makes available, the market
clearing price for the durable will be equal to the total utility that low-type
consumers derive from ownership, i.e. Vl (pc (1, y2)). Thus, we can write:
πLI2 (θ, 1, y2) = y2 (θ + α(1− θ)− y2) + (1− θ)Vl (pc (1, y2))




2 , and the first-order-

























c) When α ≤
√
θ






2 regardless of whether Q1 = 1 or































2(α + θ − αθ) ≥
θ













d) This is easily observed in Table 4.2 and Table 4.1. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2.3 Let us first consider the conditionally optimal so-
lution for Q1 = 1. By substituting (4.11) into (4.8) the FOC w.r.t. y is





all α < θ1+θ . This implies that, if Q1 = 1, the implicit rental price in period 1
would be zero since Vl(pc) = 0 for pc ≥ α. Thus, Q1 = θ dominates Q1 = 1
for any α < θ1+θ . For larger values of α, we can substitute y1 = y
c∗
1 (1) = α
and (4.11) into (4.8) and from Lemma 4.2.2 we have the following optimal
profits, conditional on Q1 = 1.
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where the upper branch of the above function represents the case in which,
given that Q1 = 1, the manufacturer will restrict consumables output in
the second period to such an extent that the market clearing price will not
induce any consumption from low-type consumers, i.e. pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2) ≥ α.
The lower branch represents the case in which pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2) ≤ α.
Now let us consider the conditionally optimal solution for Q1 = θ.
By substituting (4.10) into (4.8), the FOC w.r.t. y is yc∗1 (θ) = θ . We can now
we can substitute y1 = yc∗1 (θ) = θ and (4.16) into (4.8) and from Lemma
4.2.2 we have the following optimal profits, conditional on Q1 = θ:
π1 (θ, yc∗1 (θ)) =

θ










where the upper branch represents the case in which, given that Q1 = θ,
the manufacturer’s optimal second period response does not include selling
durables to the low-type consumers. The lower branch represents the case
in which it does.
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, the function ∆LI(α) is obtained by taking the differ-
ence between the upper branch of (B.1) and the upper branch of (C.1), to
get:
∆LI(α) =




It is easy to confirm that this is increasing and convex, and that ∆LI(α) < 0
at the point, α =
√
θ
2(1+θ) . Thus, Q
∗














, the function ∆LI(α) is obtained by taking
















It is easy to confirm that the second derivative of this function is positive,
so that it is convex. The sign of the above difference is determined by its
numerator. At the the upper limit of the range for which this difference is






, we have that the numerator of the above expression is
equal to the following:


















, we first note that it will be
increasing so long as its numerator is increasing. The first derivative of the
numerator of (B.3) is equal to:
4(1 + θ)
[
α (1 + θ)
(
1 + θ2 − ρ
)
− θ2(1 + θ − ρ)
]
Evaluating the term in brackets at the point α =
√
θ





1 + θ2 − ρ
)





1 + θ2 − ρ
)
− θ2(1 + θ − ρ)
= θ
(
1 + θ2 − ρ
)
− θ2(1 + θ − ρ) = θ (θ (1− ρ) (1− θ)) > 0
where we have used the fact that θ1+θ ≤
√
θ
2(1+θ) . It follows that Q
∗


















, the difference, ∆LI(α) is obtained by taking the differ-
ence between the lower branches of (B.1) and (C.1) to obtain:
∆LI (α) =
4 (1 + θ)2
(
α− θ + (1− α)2 θ2
)
− (1− θ) ρ (1 + 3θ) (α− (1− α) θ)2
8 (1 + θ)2
(B.5)
The second derivative of (B.5) is positive, so it is convex. The sign of (B.5) is
the same as the sign of its numerator. Evaluating the numerator at the lower











)2 ((1 + 2θ) 2√θ (−4 + ρ)− 8θ5/2 − ρ (1 + 3θ − θ2 − 3θ3 + 6θ5/2))
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< 0
Similarly, if we evaluate the numerator of (B.5) at the point, α = 1, we have
that it can be expressed as:
(−1 + θ)
(
ρ (1 + 3θ)− 4 (1 + θ)2
)
> 0









this interval, (B.5) is positive if and only if α > ᾱLI . Thus, Q∗1 = 1 if and
only if α > ᾱLI . Otherwise, Q∗1 = θ. From the results in Lemma 4.2.2, we
















Lemma 4.2.2 that says that for Q1 = 1 we will have pc (Q∗2 , y
∗








Proof of Proposition 4.2.4 Define ∆UAdi f f (α) = π
U
1 − πLI1 , that is, ∆UAdi f f (α) is
the difference between the optimal profits under unrestricted access and





access πU1 is increasing in α and profit under lock-in π
LI
1 is a constant. Fur-
ther:
















∆UAdi f f (α) < 0. Note that ∆
UA




∆UAdi f f (1) =
1
2
(1 + ρ)− 1
8















Then, there exists a set of points α̂, where
α̂ =
{




and ∆UAdi f f (α) = 0
}
, where α̂ contains an odd number of elements. Let α = max α̂ and α =
min α̂. Therefore there exists thresholds α ≤ ᾱ such that for α ≥ α unre-
stricted access dominates lock-in and for α ≤ α lock-in dominates unre-
stricted access. 
Proof of Lemma 4.2.5 Each of the n rivals maximizes its second period prof-
its below in response to the manufacturer’s actions Q2 and y20.









y2i ≤ (1− α)θ or Q2 = θ
y2i
(












y2i ≥ (1− α)θ and Q2 = 1
(B.6)
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The above expression is continuous and piece-wise concave, and the first-







a) When Q1 = 1, we must have Q2 = 1 also. Thus, the second period
model reduces to a Stackelberg game in consumables alone. The manufac-
turer can induce two types of equilibria among the rivals: one in which the
total output is low enough that pc < α so that both types of consumers
purchase the consumable in period 2, and one in which the total output is
high enough that pc ≥ α so that only high type consumers purchase pos-
itive quantities of the consumable. Let yh20 be the manufacturer’s optimal
second period consumable output conditional upon her inducing a com-
petitive response among the rivals in which pc ≥ α. Similarly, let yb20 be her
optimal second period output conditional upon her inducing a response in
which pc < α. The following two Lemmas both focus on the situation that
arises when all consumers hold the durable at the beginning of period 2.
Lemma B.0.1 (B.0.2) characterizes the manufacturer’s conditionally optimal
consumables output, given that she restricts her attention to inducing an
outcome in which pc ≥ α (pc < α).
Lemma B.0.1. If the manufacturer restricts attention to inducing an outcome
in which pc ≥ α, then her conditionally optimal policy can be characterized in














2 , and her corresponding profit is π2
(
1, 1, y f 120
)
= θ4(n+1) . For α ∈
































For α > α1(θ, n) , she cannot induce an equilibrium in which pc ≥ α even if she
reduces her own output to zero.
Proof of Lemma B.0.1 For pc ≥ α, the profit of each rival in the consumables
market is as shown in the upper branch of (B.6). Solving for the first-order
conditions, we have that each rival’s response to y20 is yr12i =
θ−y20
n+1 . Substi-
tuting this response into (4.13) we can obtain the first-order condition for
the manufacturer as y f 120 =
θ









(4.13), her corresponding profits are:
π2
(














n+1 , each rival’s profit is Π
r1 = θ4(n+1)2 .The maximum output of the man-
ufacturer that can induce pc
(
1, y20 + nyr12i
)
≥ α is y f 1max = (1− (n + 1)α)θ.
Further, y f 1max = (1− (n + 1)α)θ ≥ θ2 only if α ≤
1
2(n+1) . It remains to be
shown that no rival has a unilateral incentive to deviate from the quantity
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2 , and the output of each
of n− 1 rivals, yr12i =
θ
2(n+1) , a given consumables supplier (j) may have an
incentive to deviate by unilaterally producing enough to cause pc < α. Sub-






2(n+1) for i 6= j into the lower branch of (B.6), we
can see that if rival j were to increase her own output by enough to induce
pc < α her profit would be:
y2j
(








The first-order condition for this profit is ydev1 = α(n+1)+θ(1−α)−nαθ2(n+1) . In order









< α, which is equivalent to α > θ(n+1)(1+θ) .
Further, in order for the deviation to be profitable for the rival, we need:
ydev1
(




















(n+1)(1+θ) . That is







a unique equilibrium and result in pc ≥ α . For α ∈ [αr (θ, n) , α1(θ, n)]
, the most that the manufacturer can produce without creating an incen-
tive for at least one rival to deviate from yr12i =
θ−y20











≤ θ2 . Hence, in this range, this is her condi-
tionally optimal output quantity, and her corresponding profit can be ob-




n+1 into (4.13). Finally, when
α > αh1(θ, n), we have that y
rest
20 < 0, which implies that the manufacturer
cannot induce an equilibrium in which pc ≥ α.N
Lemma B.0.2. If the manufacturer restricts attention to inducing an outcome in
which pc < α, then for α ≥ θ(n+2θ+nθ) , she can induce such an outcome and her
conditionally optimal output quantity is y f 220 =
α+θ−αθ
2 , and her corresponding
profit is π2
(




4(n+1) . If α ≤
θ
(n+2θ+nθ) then the manufacturer may
be able to induce an outcome in which pc < α. When she can, her conditionally







Proof of Lemma B.0.2 For pc < α, the profit of each rival in the consumables
market is as shown in the lower branch of (B.6). Solving for the first-order
conditions, we have that each rival’s response to y20 is yr22i =
α+θ−αθ−y20
n+1 .
Substituting this response into (4.13), we can obtain the first-order condi-
tion for the manufacturer as y f 220 =
α+θ−αθ
2 . The minimum output of the
manufacturer for which pc
(
1, y20 + nyr22i
)
< α is y f 2min = θ − (n + θ)α. Fur-
ther, y f 2min = θ − (n + θ)α ≤
α+θ−αθ
2 only if α ≥
1
2n+1+θ . It follows that,
for α ≥ 12n+1+θ , the manufacturer’s conditionally optimal output quan-
tity (given that all rivals will respond according to yr22i =
α+θ−αθ−y20
n+1 ) is
y f 220 =
α+θ−αθ









(4.13), her corresponding profits can be obtained. Similarly, by substitut-










4(n+1)2 . It remains to be
shown that no rival has a unilateral incentive to deviate. Given the out-
put of the manufacturer, y f 220 , and the output of each of n − 1 rivals, yr22i , a
given consumables supplier (j) may have an incentive to deviate by unilat-
erally reducing its own output by enough to cause pc ≥ α. Substituting






n+1 for i 6= j into the upper branch of (B.6),












The first-order condition for the deviant rival is y2j = ydev2 = nαθ−nα+θ2(n+1) . In





≥ α, which is equivalent to α ≥ θ(n+2θ+nθ) . Further, by substituting y2j =
ydev2 and y2j = yr22i into the deviant supplier’s profit function (as shown
in (B.7)) , we can see that he is better off producing ydev2instead of yr22i only




< θ(n+2θ+nθ) . That is for α ≥
θ
(n+2θ+nθ) , the output






n+1 , define a unique equilibrium
and result in pc < α. Note that 12n+1+θ >
θ
(n+2θ+nθ) ,which ensures that
for α ≥ θ(n+2θ+nθ) , we will have that pc
(




< α. Finally, when
α ≤ θ(n+2θ+nθ) , the manufacturer may be able to induce an equilibrium in





so. Because y f 220 is the quantity that maximizes her profits given each rival
responds according to yr22i =
α+θ−αθ−y20








We can now use the results of Lemmas B.0.1 and B.0.2 to complete the proof






θ) , the manufacturer’s conditionally optimal profits are
π2
(





= θ4(n+1) , given that she induces an outcome in which
pc ≥ α. From Lemma B.0.2, we know that, for α ≥ θ(n+2θ+nθ) , the manufac-
turer’s conditionally optimal profits are πn2
(








conditional upon the restriction that she induce an equilibrium with pc < α.
Moreover, for α < θ(n+2θ+nθ) , the manufacturer’s profits from inducing an
equilibrium with pc < α are bounded above by
(α+θ−αθ)2
4(n+1) . Comparing these
two conditionally optimal profits, we can see that πn2
(



















. It is easy to see that
θ











θ) . Thus, it is
obvious that for α ≤ αr(θ, n) the manufacturer’s optimal output quantity
will be: y f 120=
θ
2 , and her corresponding profit is π2
(
1, 1, y f 120
)
= θ4(n+1) ,
and this will result in pc ≥ α. It is also obvious that, for α ≥ αr2(θ, n), the
manufacturer’s optimal output quantity will be: y f 220 = =
α+θ−αθ
2 , and her
corresponding profit is π2
(




4(n+1) , and this will result in
pc < α.
For α ∈ [αr(θ, n), αr2(θ, n)], the manufacturer can induce an equi-
librium in which pc ≥ α, and her conditionally optimal profit from doing
so is π2
(
















. It can be
shown that π2
(




1, 1, yrestr20 (α)
)
if and only if α > αr3(θ, n)
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where αr3 (θ, n) is:
θ2














θ + n + 1
)(B.8)
Let α1(θ, n) = Max {αr(θ, n), αr3(θ, n)} . It follows that the manu-
facturer will produce yrestr20 (α) if and only if αr3(θ, n) > αr(θ, n) and α ∈
(αr(θ, n), α1 (θ, n)).
b) When Q1 = θ then the monopolist has two options with respect to the
sales of the durable in period 2: She can either set Q2 = 1 and sell additional
durables to the low type consumers or she can set Q2 = θ, not selling any
more durables. If she sets Q2 = θ, and produces a quantity of consumables
y20, then the rivals maximizes their revenues as given in the upper branch
of (B.6) . Recall that the first order conditions are satisfied at yr12i =
θ−y20
n+1
. The manufacturer then maximizes πn2 (θ, θ, y20) = y20pc
(







. The first-order condition the manufacturer is y f 120 =
θ
2 and
her corresponding profit is:
π2
(





Alternatively, if she sets Q2 = 1 then the market clearing price from the ad-















> α, and the low
type consumers would obtain no benefit from owning the durable. Given
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the quantity of consumables that she makes available, the market clearing
price for the durable will be equal to the net utility that low type consumers










. Thus, we can write:




(θ + α(1− θ)− y20)
)
+ (1− θ)Vl (pc (1, y2))
Given that each rival responds according to yr22i , the manufacturer’s first-
order condition is: y f 320 =
α(1−θ2)+θ2
(1+θ) and her profits are:
π2
(
θ, 1, y f 320
)
=
α2(1− θ)(1 + 2n + θ) + θ2





θ, θ, y f 120
)




. It remains to be shown that none of the rivals will have an incentive to uni-
laterally deviate to a sufficiently low amount of output that would result in
pc ≥ α. Substituting y f 320 and yr22i for i 6= j into the upper branch of (B.6) , we
can see that if rival j if he were to unilaterally reduce his output by enough












+ (n− 1) θ




The above is maximized at ydev3 = −α−2nα+2θ+2nαθ+αθ
2
2(1+2n+θ) . It is easy to con-
firm that this deviation results in a price of consumable pc > α only if
α < 2θ(1+θ)(1+2n+θ) . By substituting y2j = y
dev3 and y2j = yr22i into rival j’s
profit function (as shown in (B.9)) and comparing, we can see that he is bet-













2(n+1)(1+2n+θ)= αθ(θ, n). Therefore,
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for any αin which the manufacturer sells durables in period 2, there is an
equilibrium in which pc < α.
c) This is easily observed in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2.6
Because the manufacturer does not face competition in the first period, for
a given output, Q1, of durables, her conditionally optimal output of con-
sumables will be the same as it was under lock-in. As shown in the proof of
Proposition 4.2.3 the conditionally optimal solution for Q1 = 1 is yc∗1 (1) = α.





only if α ≥ θ1+θ . Thus, for any α <
θ
1+θ , the manufacturer’s condition-
ally optimal consumables output, for Q1 = 1, would result in pc ≥ α. Not
only would this drive the implicit rental price for durables to zero (since
Vl(pc) = 0 for pc ≥ α), it would also mean that the low valuation consumers
would not contribute any consumables revenue to the manufacturer. It fol-
lows that Q∗1 = θ for any α <
θ
1+θ . In order to determine what happens for
α ≥ θ1+θ , it will be helpful to introduce the following Lemma:
Lemma B.0.3. For any α ≥ θ1+θ , we must have either that: α ≤ αr(θ, n) or that
αr(θ, n) = α1(θ, n). In equilibrium, we will never have Q1 = 1 when αr(θ, n) <
α1(θ, n).
Proof: Recall that, by definition, α1(θ, n) = Max {αr(θ, n), αr3(θ, n)}





θ) and αr3(θ, n) is as defined in (B.8). It is easy to
confirm that αr3(θ, n) is decreasing in n and that, for n = 1, we haveαr3(θ, 1) <
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θ
1+θ . Thus, for any n ≥ 1 such that αr(θ, n) ≥
θ
1+θ , we must have that either:
α1(θ, n)= αr3(θ, 1) < θ1+θ ; or that: α1(θ, n) = αr(θ, n). N
The implication of this result is that, for any α ≥ θ1+θ , we cannot
have α ∈ {αr(θ, n), α1(θ, n)}. Since in equilibrium, α ≥ θ1+θ is a necessary
condition to have Q∗1 = 1, the manufacturer’s second period consumables
output must be either y f 120=
θ




2 whenever we consider the
possibility of Q1 = 1. Thus, by substituting y1 = yc∗1 (1) = α and (4.17) into
(4.14) , from Lemma 4.2.5 and Lemma B.0.3 we can obtain the following
expression for the manufacturer’s conditionally optimal profit given that








α2 + (1− α)2θ2
)









αθ(1− α) + ρ (α+θ−αθ)
2
4(n+1) if α ≥ αr(θ, n)
(B.10)
where the upper branch of the above function represents the case in which,
given that Q1 = 1, the consumables output in the second period is such that
the market clearing price will not induce any consumption from low-type
consumers, i.e. pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2) ≥ α. The lower branch represents the case in
which pc (Q∗2 , y
∗
2) ≤ α.
Now let us consider the conditionally optimal solution for Q1 = θ.
Recall that the FOC w.r.t. y is yc∗1 (θ) = θ. We can now we can substitute
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y1 = yc∗1 (θ) = θ and (4.16) into (4.14) and from Lemma 4.2.5 we have the
























2(1+2n+θ) if α ≥ αθ(θ, n)
(B.11)
where the upper branch represents the case in which, given that Q1 = θ,
the second period response output is such that the manufacturer does not
sell additional durables to the low-type consumers. The lower branch rep-
resents the case in which it does. To determine the equilibrium values, Q∗1
and Q∗2 , we need to consider three thresholds:
θ
1+θ , αr(θ, n), and αθ(θ, n). To










(2n + 1)(n + 1)
2(1 + 2n + θ)
It is easy to confirm that the right hand side of the above expression is in-
creasing in n for n ≥ 1, and that the inequality is valid at n = 1.
However, although we have just confirmed that αr(θ, n) ≤ αθ(θ, n), there
are three possibilities for the ordering of θ1+θ with respect to αr(θ, n) and
αθ(θ, n): i) αr(θ, n) ≤ αθ(θ, n) < θ1+θ , ii) αr(θ, n) ≤
θ
1+θ < αθ(θ, n) and
iii) θ1+θ ≤ αr(θ, n) < αθ(θ, n) . We consider each of these possibilities in
evaluating the optimal strategies for the manufacturer in period 1.
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Case i) αr(θ, n) ≤ αθ(θ, n) < θ1+θ
Because αr(θ, n) < θ1+θ , the threshold αr(θ, n) plays no role in the com-
parison of profits under Q1 = θ and Q1 = 1. As discussed above, for any
α ≤ θ1+θ , the manufacturer will set Q∗1 = θ. From Lemma 4.2.5, we know




she will set Q∗2 = 1.
For α ≥ θ1+θ we can evaluate the additional profit, denoted ∆C1 (α, n), that
the manufacturer would earn from increasing her output from Q1 = θ to
Q1 = 1 by subtracting the the lower branch of (B.11) from the lower branch
of (B.10) . We have
∆C1 (α, n) =
(
α2 − θ + (1− α)2θ2
)
2
− (1− θ)ρ (1 + 3θ + 2n(1 + θ)) (θ − α(1 + 2n + θ))
2
8(n + 1)2(1 + 2n + θ)2
Observe that ∆C1 (α, n) is quadratic in α. Evaluating ∆
C
1 (α, n) at α = 0 and
α = 1, it is easy to confirm that ∆C1 (0, n) ≤ 0 while ∆C1 (1, n) ≥ 0. It follows




= 0 . Evaluating
∆C1 (α, n) at α =
θ







≤ 0 , which implies
that αC ≥ θ1+θ and that Q∗1 = 1 for α ≥ α
C.
Case ii) αr(θ, n) ≤ θ1+θ < αθ(θ, n)
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As in case i) , the threshold αr(θ, n) plays no role in the comparison of prof-
its under Q1 = θ and Q1 = 1. As described above, for α ≤ θ1+θ , the man-




1+θ , αθ(θ, n)
)
, we can evaluate the additional profit, denoted ∆C2 (α, n),
that the manufacturer would earn from increasing her output from Q1 = θ
to Q1 = 1 by subtracting the upper branch of (B.11) from the lower branch
of (B.10) We have:





















3 + 6n + 4n2 − 2α(1− α)
)
+ (3 + 2n) (1− α)2 θ2
)
By differentiating twice with respect to α, It can be confirmed that ∆C2 (α, n)
convex in α, and it is easy to confirm that ∆C2 (0, n) ≤ 0 while ∆C2 (1, n) ≥ 0
. By substituting α = αθ(θ, 0) into the above, it can readily be confirmed
that ∆C2 (αθ(θ, 0), n) ≤ 0. Because αθ(θ, n) is decreasing in n it follows
that ∆C2 (αθ(θ, n), n) ≤ 0, and that Q1 = θ dominates Q1 = 1 for α ∈(
θ
1+θ , αθ(θ, n)
)
. From Lemma 4.2.5, it follows that Q2 = θ .
For α ≥ αθ(θ, n), we again compare profits in the lower branch of (B.10)
to the profits in the lower branch of (B.11) as we did for case i). Recall
that ∆C1 (0, n) ≤ 0 , ∆C1 (1, n) ≥ 0 and that there is a unique value of α ∈
(0, 1) for which ∆C1 (α, n) = 0 . Recall also that αθ(θ, n) is decreasing in n.
154
Thus, if ∆C1 (α, n) ≤ 0 when evaluated at α = αθ(θ, 0), then this will imply
that ∆C1 (α, n) ≤ 0 when evaluated at α = αθ(θ, n) for any n ≥ 0. From
substituting into the lower branch of (B.10) and the lower branch of (B.11)
we have:















2(1+θ)(1 + 2n + θ)
)2
8(1 + n)2(1 + 2n + θ)2
≤ 0
To see that the inequality is valid, it is obvious that the final term is negative.













































− 1 + 2θ
2(1 + θ)
=
2θ(1 + θ)− (1 + 2θ)
(


























Hence ∆C1 (αθ(θ, n), n) ≤ 0, and it follows that α
C ≥ αθ(θ, n) such




, we will have, Q1 = θ while for α ≥ αC, we will
have Q1 = 1 . In either case, we know from Lemma 4.2.5, that Q2 = 1.
Case iii) θ1+θ ≤ αr(θ, n) < αθ(θ, n)
For α ≤ θ1+θ , we have previously determined that Q1 = θ and since
θ
1+θ ≤ αθ(θ, n), Lemma 4.2.5 implies that Q2 = θ. For For α ∈
[
θ
1+θ , αr(θ, n)
]
we can evaluate the additional profit, denoted ∆C3 (α, n), that the manufac-
turer would earn from increasing her output from Q1 = θ to Q1 = 1 by
subtracting the upper branch of (B.11)from the upper branch of (B.10). to
the upper branch of (B.11) . We have:














By differentiating twice with respect to α, it is easy to confirm that ∆C3 (α)
is quadratic and convex in α. There are at most two roots of the equation
∆C3 (α) = 0. Further, note that ∆
C
3 (0) ≤ 0 and that ∆C3 (α) ≤ 0 when eval-
uated at α = αr(θ, n). It follows that ∆C3 (α) ≤ 0 for all α ∈
[
θ
1+θ , αr(θ, n)
]
.
Thus, in this region, Q1 = θ and Lemma4.2.5 implies that Q2 = θ . For
α ∈ [αr(θ, n), αθ(θ, n)], we evaluate ∆C2 (α, n). However, from our analy-
sis above, we know that ∆C2 (αθ(θ, n), n) ≤ 0, which implies that Q1 = θ
in this region. From Lemma4.2.5, we will also have Q2 = θ . For α ≥
αθ(θ, n), we evaluate ∆C1 (α). However, from our analysis above, we know
that ∆C1 (αθ(θ, n) ≤ 0. Therefore there exists a threshold α
C ∈ [αθ(θ, n), 1]
such that for α ∈
[
αθ(θ, n), αC(n, θ)
]
we will have Q1 = θ while for α ≥ αC,
we will have Q1 = 1 . In both cases, we will have Q2 = 1.
In each of the three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
cases above, α ≤ αθ(θ, n) is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for
Q1 = Q2 = θ in equilibrium. It follows that αC(n, θ) = αθ(θ, n). Similarly,
in each of the three cases, there exists a threshold αC(n, θ) ≥ αC(n, θ) such
that for α ∈
(
αC(n, θ), αC(n, θ)
)
we will have Q1 = θand Q2 = 1 while for
α ≥ αC(n, θ), we will have Q1 = Q2 = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2.7 Let us define ∆di f f (α) = πn1 −πLI1 , that is, ∆di f f (α)
is the difference in profits of the manufacturer under competition and lock-









. Evaluating ∆di f f (α) at α = 0 and α = 1,
it is easy to confirm that ∆di f f (α) > 0 at both of these values of α for any
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θ ∈ (0, 1) and any n ≥ 1. The result follows from the fact that for every
θ ∈ (0, 1), we have αC(n, θ) > 0 and αLI(θ) < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.8 Recall that QU2 = 1 for all α and θ . We know from
Propositions 4.2.3 and 4.2.6, that the threshold α above which the manufac-
turer sells to both groups under lock-in as well as competition (α) is less




2(n+1)(1+2n+θ) is decreasing in n. That is α
C(n, θ) ≤ αC(0, θ) =
αLI(θ). Therefore QLI2 ≤ QC2 . 
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Appendix C
Durable Products and Contingent Consumables:
The effect of Consumable Stock-piling on the
Interaction between Time Inconsistency and
Lock-in
Proof of Lemma 5.2.1
a)When Q1 = 1, we must have Q2 = 1 also. Thus, (5.7) reduces to maximiz-
ing the following second period profit function with respect to the quantity
of consumables:






if y2 + x1 ≤ (1− α)θ
y2 (θ + α(1− θ)− y2 − x1) if y2 + x1 ≥ (1− α)θ
where we have simply substituted (5.9) and (5.5) into (5.7). The above
expression is continuous and piece-wise concave, and the first-order con-





2 respectively. It is easy to show that y
s2
2 < (1− α)θ − x1 if
and only if α < θ−x11+θ , while y
s1
2 > (1− α)θ if and only if α >
1−x1
2 . It follows
from this and the continuity of πS2 (1, 1, y2, x1) that α <
θ−x1
1+θ implies that the
optimal quantity of consumables is y∗2 = y
s1














, then both ys12 ≤ (1 − α)θ − x1 and ys22 ≥
(1 − α)θ − x1, so both of them are candidates to be the optimal quantity.









if and only if x ≤ −α
√
θ + θ(1− α) .
b) When Q1 = θ then the monopolist has two options with respect to the
sales of the durable in period 2: She can either set Q2 = 1 and sell additional
durables to the low-type consumers or she can set Q2 = θ, not selling any
more durables. If she sets Q2 = θ, then she produces the quantity of con-
sumables that maximizes her revenues from selling consumables to high-





Alternatively, if she sets Q2 = 1 then the market clearing price from the ad-
ditional durable sales will be positive if and only if y2 + x2 ≥ (1− α)θ. Oth-
erwise, the price of consumables would be prohibitively high, i.e. pc (1, y2, x1) >
α, and the low-type consumers would obtain no benefit from owning the
durable. Given the quantity of consumables that she makes available, the
market clearing price for the durable will be equal to the total utility that
low-type consumers derive from ownership, i.e. Vl (pc (1, y2 + x1)). Thus,
we can write:
πS2 (θ, 1, y2, x1) = y2 (θ + α(1− θ)− y2 − x1) + (1− θ)Vl (pc (1, y2 + x1))




2 , and the first-order-













θ, θ, ys32 , x1
)
if and only if x1 ≥ θ − α
√
2θ(1 + θ).
c) x(1)− x(θ) = −α
√
θ + θ(1− α)− (θ− α
√







θ)) . It is easy to see that x(1)− x(θ) ≥ 0 only if 1 + θ − 2
√
θ ≥ 0,
which is always true .
Proof of Lemma 5.2.2
The quantity of consumables that are stock-piled in period 1 depends on
the amount of durables sold in period 1, Q1, the output of consumables y1
and consumers anticipation of the manufacturer’s response in period 2. The
amount consumables stock-piled in period 1 is the solution of the following
equation:
pc1(Q1, y1, x1) = pc2(Q∗2(Q1, y1, x1), y
∗
2(Q1, x1), x1)
When Q1 = θ and consumers anticipate that Q2 = 1, substituting the results
obtained in Table 5.2, 5.4 and the inverse demand function obtained from
5.3 into the above equation, we obtain the following equation:






Solving the above equation for x1 gives us x1 = 11+2θ (y1(1 + θ)− θ) . Note
that from Lemma 5.2.1 x1 = 11+2θ (y1(1 + θ)− θ) ≥ x(θ) = θ− α
√
2θ(1 + θ)
so that the stock-piled consumables are in a large enough quantity so as
to induce sales to the low end consumers in period 2, which results in the




When Q1 = θ and consumers anticipate that Q2 = θ, substituting the
results obtained in Table 5.2, 5.4 and the inverse demand function obtained
from 5.3 into 5.8, we obtain the following equation:





Solving the above equation for x1 gives us x1 = 13(2y1 − θ) .
When Q1 = 1 , note that if the manufacturer serves both types in
period 1 then by the equality of price of consumables in both periods, the
manufacturer will also serve both types in period 2. Substituting the results
obtained in Table 5.1, 5.4 and the inverse demand function obtained from
5.3 into 5.8, we obtain the following equation:
α + θ − αθ − (y1 − x1) =
α + θ − αθ − x1
2
Solving the above equation for x1 gives us x1 = 13(2y1 − θ − α(1 − θ))
. Note that from Lemma 5.2.1 x1 = 13(2y1 − θ − α(1 − θ)) ≥ x(1) =
−α
√
θ + θ(1− α) so that the stock-piled consumables are high enough to














Proof of Proposition 5.2.3
Let us first consider the manufacturer’s problem for Q1 = θ. The profits of
the manufacturer as a function of y1conditional on Q1 = θ are given as
follows:












where the upper branch represents the case in which, given that Q1 = θ,
the manufacturer’s optimal second period response does not include selling
durables to the low-type consumers. The lower branch represents the case
in which it does. The slope of the profits represented by the upper branch
at y1 = α(1 + 2θ)
√
2θ







> 0 . In order to sell durables
to high type consumers only the manufacturer will produce no more than
y1 = α(1 + 2θ)
√
2θ





1 > α(1 + 2θ)
√
2θ






can now summarize the conditionally optimal profits of the manufacturer













Now let us consider the manufacturer’s problem for Q1 = 1. The profits of
the manufacturer as a function of y1conditional on Q1 = θ are given as
follows:
We can now we can substitute y1 = yc∗1 (θ) = θ and (5.13) into (4.8) and from
Lemma 4.2.2 we have the following optimal profits, conditional on Q1 = 1:
π1 (θ, y1) =














The FOC w.r.t. y1 for the above function gives us the optimal quantity ys2∗1 =

















conditionally optimal profits of the manufacturer when Q1 = 1 is summa-
rized below:
π∗1 (1) =
 α4 (α(3− 2
√
θ) + (4− 5α)θ − 4(1− α)θ 32 ) if α ≤ α̂S =
2θ
1 + 2θ +
√
θ
α2 + (1− α)2θ2 otherwise
(C.3)




and α̂S = 2θ1+2θ+
√
θ
. Consider the first possibility αS(θ) < α̂S. Let us define
∆S1(α) as the difference in profits between the upper branch of π
∗
1 (θ) and
the upper branch of π∗1 (1). It is easy to see that ∆
S
1(α) is quadratic in α .
Further ∆S1(α = 0) > 0 and
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θ + 13θ) < 0
Therefore, there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that ∆S1(α) = 0 . It can be easily










) > 0 .
Now let us define ∆S2(α) as the difference in profits between the lower
branch of π∗1 (θ) and the upper branch of π
∗
1 (1). It is easy to see that ∆
S
2(α)
is convex and decreasing in α . Further ∆S2(α = 0) > 0 . It can be easily










) > 0 . Therefore
the upper branch of π∗1 (1) is not an equilibrium outcome. Clearly then,
for α ≤ αS(θ), the manufacturer sells durables to high type consumers in
period 1 and does not sell additional durables in period 2.
Now let us define ∆S3(α) as the difference in profits between the up-
per branch of π∗1 (θ) and the lower branch of π
∗
1 (1). It is easy to see that
∆S3(α) is quadratic in α . Further ∆
S
3(α = 0) > 0 and





+ θ) < 0
Therefore, there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that ∆S3(α) = 0 . It can be easily










) > 0 .Now
let us define ∆S4(α) as the difference in profits between the lower branch of
π∗1 (θ) and the lower branch of π
∗
1 (1). It is easy to see that ∆
S
4(α) is quadratic
in α . Further ∆S4(α = 1) = −
1
4(1− θ) < 0 and
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